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ABSTRACT 
 
The Problem of Love from Sartre and Beauvoir to Irigaray. 
(May 2006) 
Shaun Douglas Miller, B.A., Utah State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael Hand 
 
The common idea of love is a fusion of the individuals into one.  The idea has 
permeated throughout society so that it has now been taken for granted.  Such an idea of 
fusion of two individuals is actually harmful rather than helpful.  In this thesis, I will 
show why the fusion model is not a prime model of love that one should follow, starting 
with Sartre.  He is the paradigmatic example of the traditional model of love going 
wrong.  By taking the fusion model to its final culmination, love is impossible or—
among other things— sadomasochistic.  Beauvoir reads Sartre’s view as a bad-faith 
version of love.  She inserts her view by giving an account of the “woman in love” 
which is an example of a woman under Sartre’s interpretation of love.  After showing 
why love under Sartre cannot be true, Beauvoir states that authentic love can only 
happen if the individuals are equal.  That way, love can have grounds for culmination 
and fusion.  Irigaray looks at the fusion model as debunked.  She sees what Sartre and 
Beauvoir try to do but they are still assuming major things.  Irigaray states that genuine 
love is based on the differences—particularly sexual differences—which Sartre and 
Beauvoir have failed to realize.  By looking at Irigaray’s account of love, the traditional 
fusion model is debunked and love based on differences is applauded. 
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DEDICATION 
To those seeking wisdom of love, and love of wisdom.
   
 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I have always thought that a major project like a thesis is just like writing another 
philosophy paper, except longer.  Clearly I underestimated the extent of that attitude.  
After researching this topic, there are plenty of people whom I would consider a 
tremendous help with my project as well as helping my critical thinking skills.  First, I 
would like to thank Dr. Michael Hand.  His enthusiastic approach to my project has 
encouraged me to get this thesis finished in a timely manner.  Thanks to Dr. Ted George 
for developing critical thinking skills pertaining to the topic by always asking the hard 
questions.  I am still thinking about the questions.  And thanks to Dr. Marian Eide for 
giving me a different approach to this topic and how I could further this thesis into other 
projects.  Each of them has sacrificed their schedules and obligations in order to help me 
and I am grateful for it.  They have worked hard with me. 
My experience at Texas A&M University has been interesting.  Manuela Gomez 
is truly a good friend.  She has always given me an opportunity to speak my mind as 
well as share our humor together.  She has given me insight into what philosophy is 
about: experiencing life instead of a storage facility for compiling trivia.  I shall truly 
miss our adventures together. 
Travis and Teresa Kohnert are the only friends I made in this town that were not 
part of the department.  By explaining my ideas to non-philosophers, they asked me 
simple questions that I needed to take into account and they would gladly listen without 
critique or apathy.  I was glad to have them around so that I could enjoy a break outside 
of the department. 
  
vi 
My parents have given me an interesting take on relationships.  Although I do not 
consider them to follow the traditional model of love, they also do not embrace the 
model of love that I argue for in the end.  Their relationship has given me a base of 
comparison for other love relationships and I am still wondering how to frame their 
relationship into a model.  It has given me insight to try to form my own idea of what a 
model of love is. 
Finally, I must thank Julie.  Without her, this thesis would not have been 
realized.  She has culminated the idea that long-distance relationships are possible and 
this thesis is proof of that.  It is also wonderful that whenever I broach her on this 
subject, she does not belittle, discourage, or enrage me.  Indeed, she has even brought up 
certain philosophical questions about love that has helped me think things through and 
has even brought them to light in this thesis.  It is ironic that whenever I sat to write this 
thesis, there have been times where I could not write because all I could think about was 
her.  Her encouragement to write and finish the project has helped me become aware of 
our relationship and our time away from each other.  The space between us truly tested 
our relationship.  I thank Julie for her tolerance, gratitude, but most importantly, 
patience. 
  
vii 
NOMENCLATURE 
An Ethics  An Ethics of Sexual Difference 
BN   Being and Nothingness 
ILTY   I Love to You 
JTN   Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of Difference 
NE   No Exit 
SG   Sexes and Genealogies 
Speculum  Speculum of the Other Woman 
SS   The Second Sex 
This Sex  This Sex Which is Not One 
TBT   To Be Two 
WD   Why Different? 
WL   The Way of Love 
WML   Witness to My Life 
  
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... iii 
 
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................................v 
 
NOMENCLATURE.........................................................................................................vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES...........................................................................................................ix 
 
CHAPTER 
 
I       INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................1 
 
II      SARTRE................................................................................................................7 
 
III     BEAUVOIR ........................................................................................................35 
 
IV     IRIGARAY .........................................................................................................61 
 
            Freud.............................................................................................................64 
            Lacan ............................................................................................................67 
            Sexual Difference and “Essentialism” .........................................................81 
            Criticism of Essentialism .............................................................................87 
            Against Sartre ...............................................................................................93 
            Love..............................................................................................................97 
 
V      CONCLUSION .................................................................................................113 
 
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................118 
 
VITA ..............................................................................................................................123 
  
ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE          Page 
 
 
     1  The Traditional Model ..............................................................................................6 
 
     2  The Sartrean Model .................................................................................................33 
 
     3  The Beauvoirian Model...........................................................................................53 
 
     4  The Irigarayan Model............................................................................................106 
 
   
 
1 
CHAPTER I1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 I am a man.  My sex is male.  This may not seem such a huge significance.  Why 
is that?  Why is it that when Beauvoir and Irigaray claim that they are woman, it makes a 
difference?  It is because the history of philosophy has been written mostly by men.  
Their sex never occurred to them.  Why think about one’s sex when their sex has nothing 
to do with their philosophy?  However, thanks to Beauvoir and Irigaray, the sex does 
matter.   
 In writing this thesis, I have come to realize that love is not immediately tied to a 
sexual disposition.  Indeed, the typical view we receive about the philosophical aspects 
of love has to do with the act of sex.  Why is that?  I believe it is because since most of 
the philosophers were men, they tended to think of love tied up with coition.  Love, for 
the masculine model, is somehow related to sex.  Indeed, love is impossible without sex. 
 However if we look at the feminine philosophers, we see that their view of love 
is not tied immediately with coition.  Indeed, they either see love as something that 
should be thought about for its own sake, or something that is contrary to coition.  Yet 
these feminists seem to admit their bias; they will admit that being female is what drives 
their philosophy.  Should it be considered a problem?  If so, why is this a problem? 
 The theme of this thesis is love.  I have started with the assumption of the fusion 
model that so permeates our society.  Why did I choose this model?  I believe this model 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format of The Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
 
  
2 
is so strongly saturated in our society, that people follow this idea dogmatically.  I have 
also chosen this model because it has the idea of a relationship having full fruition, 
which has a completion in either coition (where to two can become one physically) or in 
marriage (the two becomes one in religious, property, or State terms).  However, the idea 
is so strong that we now view single people as culturally inferior.  If the people involved 
do indeed get into a relationship, it is not a legitimate relationship until they are married.  
And if they do get married, it is not a legitimate marriage unless they have children.  
Now it has come to the point where the fusion model must be debunked.  However, 
people’s beliefs do not change easily.  One must make another aware of the problem.  It 
is the purpose of this thesis to make others acknowledge the problems in hopes for, as 
Irigaray would say, a community of love. 
 The relationship among Sartre, Beauvoir, and Irigaray is hardly mentioned when 
it comes to love.  Although there have been many articles expediting Sartre’s view of 
love, there have virtually been no references to Beauvoir’s or Irigaray’s view of it.   By 
analyzing love from the feminists’ point of view, I hope that as a male, a heterosexual 
male living in the 21st Western century, I can find a new love without resorting to the 
fusion model. 
In chapter II, I consider Jean-Paul Sartre’s view of love.  He looks at the fusion 
model and finds this view impossible.  He states that love cannot come to fruition 
because it will only lead to sadomasochism, hate, desire, or indifference.  Instead of love 
being complete as in the fusion model, Sartre views lovers as an ongoing circle where 
both individuals trade their dominance and submission to each other.   
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By looking at our facticity and transcendence, loving someone means that we can 
only love another object.  However, we do not want to love someone as an object; we 
want to love a subject.  Through Sartrean metaphysics, this cannot be done.  I give an 
analysis of Sartre’s view with his metaphysics and determine that there is love is 
impossible, or at least it leads to sadomasochism, indifference, or hatred.  I will 
primarily look at Being and Nothingness but also look at his play No Exit because one 
can apply his philosophy and see how the dynamics of love are played out.  Why did I 
choose Sartre?  I choose him because he is the paradigm example of love being 
impossible.  I wanted to see impossible love to show that the reason it is impossible is 
because Sartre may be saying something different, but he is holding on to the rubric of 
fusion.  He is still finding a way to make the lovers the same.  I also chose Sartre 
because I wanted to show that the fusion model is debunked and Sartre is the 
paradigmatic example of showing that. 
In chapter III, I turn to Simone de Beauvoir because she is in the same tradition 
as Sartre: existentialism.  As such, she would be a great source for a dialogue with Sartre 
when she states that love is possible.  I have also chosen Beauvoir is because she is a 
link for my next chapter on Irigaray with a tie to feminism. 
Looking at Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s personal life, one can see that they had an 
intense love affair.  By showing that they have thought of their love life differently, 
Beauvoir looks at Sartre’s view and she states that it is a bad faith version of love.  She 
then explicates authentic love.  Before delving forward, she explains woman’s plight in 
our history and explains how and why women have been considered the submissive sex.  
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After reasoning that it cannot be biological, it must be a social matter on how and why 
women have become oppressed.  I show that Beauvoir’s “woman in love” is an 
application of Sartre’s bad-faith view of love: the woman is always submissive to her 
man and gives her transcendence to him.  He however, can do anything he wants to do 
but she is always serving him.  If he leaves, he can move on.  She, however, cannot do 
so because she has already dedicated her life to him.  She has become an object of 
fascination for him but she only loves him because he is a man, and loving is her goal: 
any man will do. 
Beauvoir’s authentic version of love is by two mutual liberties (subjectivities) 
coming together.  This means that females should not be passive and sit idly.  They must 
be active and demand equal socio-economic status in history.  The female must become 
equal with the male for there to be true liberation in society.  From there, authentic love 
is possible.  My focus will be on The Second Sex, particularly the chapter entitled “The 
Woman in Love.” 
Finally, in chapter IV, I turn to Luce Irigaray.  She finds Beauvoir’s view 
phallocentric: Beauvoir is stating that for women to be equal to men, they must be like 
men.  Irigaray’s critique is that socio-economic standards are not enough.  There must be 
something else that needs to be taken into consideration and that is sexual difference.   
After a look at what Irigaray means by sexual difference, along with a brief 
understanding of Lacan, I apply this to Irigaray’s notion of love.  There is also some 
concern about Irigaray being labeled as an “essentialist” and heading toward a 
heteronormative stance.  I will show that this is a misinterpretation of her works and that 
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sexual difference does not mean biological or gender differences.  I will be focusing her 
earlier works (Speculum of the Other Woman, This Sex Which is Not One, An Ethics of 
Sexual Difference) to get a foundational base of what she means by sexual difference.  I 
will then focus on her later works (To Be Two, The Way of Love, I Love to You, je, tu, 
nous) that deals with the topic of love. 
An important thing to distinguish Irigaray from the previous philosophers is that 
she is not engaged in a fusion of the couple.  She is not for it (i.e. Beauvoir) or against it 
(i.e. Sartre).  Rather, she does not want to be part of the fusion debate at all.  She looks at 
both sides of the debate and claims that both sides are missing something (sexual 
difference) and that they have many assumptions.  For both sides, they are assuming that 
love can only happen (1) under a unification of the individuals, (2) if the individuals are 
equal, and (3) under a pre-existing framework of the metaphysics of the Same.  In the 
end, Irigaray argues that a fusion is possible, but one would not want that anyways 
because it leads to Sartrean sadomasochism.  In fact, one would not want love qua union 
at all.  Irigaray does not want to be part of the heritage of the fusion model as Sartre and 
Beauvoir have.  The idea is not to fix the problem by not entering the debate of the 
fusion model; rather it is to offer a new model where there is no rubric of fusion at all.  
Genuine love for Irigaray means that the lovers have to be different which is a key 
element to her notion of sexual difference.  The model of love that we often see in our 
society is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  The Traditional Model.  As the lovers begin overlap, they eventually fuse and then become 
one identity.  The two becomes one. 
 
 
 
Why love?  Philosophers often engage in questions that deal with meaning: God, 
ethics, or simply life.  No one, however, talks about relationships with other people, 
particularly love.  Ironically, love is considered one of the most important things we 
consider for a meaningful life and relationship.  If it is so meaningful, why is there not 
much dialogue about it?  The objective of this thesis is to have a dialogue with these 
philosophers about love and what the outcome is.  In the end, I aim to dispel the fusion 
model and aim for a love of difference.   
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CHAPTER II 
SARTRE 
Two becomes one.  Such is the idea in love.  Is it truly ontologically possible?  
The idea that individuals in love can become one is nice, but the individuals can never 
become one.  These individuals come from very different backgrounds and personalities.  
There can never be a fitting because our “edges” never correspond to another’s “edges.”  
The “fitting” cannot happen without friction or grinding.  We can never form a coherent 
and seamless unity.   We tend to think of the individual demanding self-assertion, self-
definition.  But love demands a mutual self, a shared self: it is a mutual and shared 
definition.  This rubric is continued in the early philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
especially in his play No Exit.  Although Sartre does not state that love is possible, he 
follows the heritage of the tradition by affirming the fusion of the lovers.  Yet Sartre 
replies to the tradition in arguing that love cannot work for the concept of individuals 
coming into a mutual entity is impossible.  
Before I investigate Sartre’s view of love, I will need to mention Hegel because 
Hegel was a major influence on Sartre, particularly with the views on the 
Lord/Bondsman relationship.  Even though Sartre’s view of the master/servitude 
dialectic may not coincide with Hegel’s, Sartre’s new master/servitude dialectic does 
have some insight one the dynamics of relationships. 
To start from Hegel, I gain simple consciousness of objects in the world (e.g. 
houses and trees).  There is an awareness that these objects are distinct from each other.  
In order to get full consciousness, one must negate and destroy the other things it comes 
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across.  We want to prove our independence.  Through this, self-consciousness 
completes itself.  It comes to see itself having an awareness of reality, albeit a 
rudimentary form of it. 
 With desire, we are gratified by mastering and overcoming the objects.  After all, 
we “devour” food; “demolish” things such as paper, cans, and boxes; and we “dominate” 
and tame the animals.  Through this, we satisfy our desires by overcoming the objects 
we come across, by mastering the objects by annihilating their existence by destroying 
them.  Our goal is to master the objects around us.   
For a non-rudimentary version of self-consciousness, one must encounter another 
self-consciousness, for that would give each self-consciousness recognition of itself 
through each other.  “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact 
that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”2  I see the 
other and see what she has that I do not have.  What the other has is my non-being.  It is 
reflected back to me and I see the non-I in the other.  In other words, the best I can do is 
only be conscious of you, I do not have you.  “Self-consciousness is faced by another 
self-consciousness; it has come out of itself.  This has a twofold significance: first, it has 
lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the 
other, for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own 
self.”3  To use Sartrean terms, I see you as a body and that is the only thing that I can 
ever come across.  I can never come across your mind; I can never come across your 
subjective “I”.  Thus, you and I recognize ourselves mutually recognizing each other. 
                                                 
2
 Hegel, 111.  My emphasis. 
3
 Ibid. 
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Trouble looms however.  If this is what consciousness does naturally, what do we 
do when we encounter another consciousness that tries to cancel me out “[f]or the other 
is equally independent and self-contained”?4  I do not want to be negated.  More than 
this, I lose my ego in confrontation in another, but I see it myself reflected in the other.  
Thus, I must do what I have been doing to other objects: I must desire, master, and 
negate this other self-consciousness.  In other words, we seek the death of the other.  
However, the other is also trying to master, negate, and seek the death of me.  We try to 
cancel the other out.  This struggle is nothing but each consciousness seeking “to assert 
its own selfhood by killing the other.”5  It is the struggle unto death as Hegel puts it.  In 
doing this, I am risking my life and the other is also risking hers.6  The point though, is 
not only to defeat the other, but to make the other acknowledge and realize that she has 
been defeated and negated by me.  What I desire is not only mastering the other, but to 
have the other recognize my mastery.   
 Could there be a compromise of sorts?  Why not have the two self-
consciousnesses recognize each other’s individuality and leave it at that?  The answer is 
that if there is a compromise, then there is also a giving up.  There is an ontological loss 
if I concede to the Other.  Even showing signs of wanting a compromise puts me in a 
weaker position where the Other can dominate me.  Giving up means I must make room 
for you: my space, my awareness.   
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 112. 
5
 Lavine, 220. 
6
 An excellent analogy is the American Declaration of Independence where America did not become 
independent by claiming that it itself was independent, but by risking its life which thus brought a 
recognition of its independence. 
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 There is a drawback however.  “[T]he self-conscious ego wants to eliminate the 
other in order to establish its own independence.  But if it succeeds in this it will be 
eliminating itself, because the other is itself (i.e., the source of its selfhood).”7  If I truly 
kill the other, the relationship is destroyed.  I no longer have control and mastery of the 
other because she is dead.  Thus, I must preserve her in a sense.  “I need to have the 
other self exist in order to be conscious of my own selfhood.  I require, in order to 
become conscious of my being a self, that another self recognize me as a self, look at me 
as a self.”8  I then see that I am and am not the other because we recognize each other 
mutually recognizing each other.  Thus, I cannot become aware of myself unless there is 
an other that can recognize me, that is “as another self serves as a mirror for us.”9  There 
is then an existential dependence on the Other because the Other serves as a mirror for 
me.  It is ironic how I depend on the Other to get a conception of my self as well as 
submitting myself to the Other.   
This will be best exemplified in Sartre’s play No Exit.  We use people as mirrors 
because they tell us what we look like and in the play, Inez must serve as a mirror for 
Estelle when she is applying make-up to herself since there are no mirrors in hell.  
Estelle is worried that since there are no mirrors around, she does not know how she 
looks as others look at her.  After the make-up is applied, Estelle asks how does it look, 
after all, how is Estelle’s taste similar to Inez’s taste?   
ESTELLE: But how can I rely upon your taste?  Is it the same as my taste? . . . 
INEZ: I have your taste, by dear, because I like you so much. . . Am I not nicer 
                                                 
7
 Rauch,  89. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
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than your glass? 
ESTELLE:  Oh, I don’t know.  You scare me rather.  My reflection in the 
glass never did that; of course, I knew it so well.  Like something I had 
tamed  . . . I’m going to smile, and my smile will sink down into your 
pupils, and heaven knows what it will become. [. . .] 
INEZ:  I’m your lark-mirror, my dear, and you can’t escape me . . . There isn’t 
any pimple, not a trace of one.  So what about it?  Suppose the mirror 
started telling lies?  Or suppose I covered my eyes—as he is doing 
[Garcin]—and refused to look at you, all that loveliness of yours would 
be wasted on the desert air.  No, don’t be afraid, I can’t help looking at 
you, I shan’t turn my eyes away.  And I’ll be nice to you, ever so nice.  
Only you must be nice to me, too. 
ESTELLE:  Are you really—attracted by me? 
INEZ:  Very much indeed. 
ESTELLE: . . . But I wish he’d [Garcin] notice me, too. 
INEZ:  Of course!  Because he’s a Man!  [To Garcin]  You’ve won.10 
 
The recognition is from the Other because we see ourselves in the Other.  In the play, 
Inez will provide a sense of self for Estelle. 
 I cannot kill the Other, for I would lose myself through the loss of the Other.  I 
lose the recognition that I am the master.  Also, if the Other is dead, I have no other self 
to recognize me as a self.  I have no other self to be the mirror for me which tells me that 
I am a self being recognized.  I cannot fully realize who I am if I remain by myself in 
nature.  The only way I can gain proper consciousness of myself is when my self-
understanding is recognized and confirmed by others.  Thus, “I know I am a self because 
I see you looking at me, responding to me, as a self.  It is clear, then, that consciousness 
of my own existence requires the existence of another self.”11 
 Death of the other, then, would in a sense kill my self as well.  Thus, I must let 
the other live.  However, I must still show my mastery over her.  I must show that I am 
                                                 
10
 NE, 21-22. 
11
 Rauch, 89. 
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the victor.  Hence, I preserve the other’s life, but I still show “who’s boss” by making 
her do things for me.  If she refuses, I threaten death to her.  In this sense, I have 
preferred self-consciousness and freedom instead of life; the other, on the other hand, 
prefers life to self-consciousness.  The other fears death which in turn becomes the 
servant.  “Spared by the master, it [the slave] is preserved as a thing is preserved.  It 
recognizes the master, but it is not recognized by him.”12  The Other, then, is my servant.  
In this way, I have control over the servant and servant must learn to accept this.  The 
servant’s actions are now my actions “for what the bondsman does is really the action of 
the lord.”13 
 Contradictions arise however.  Eventually, I realize that I need the servant.  I 
cannot do things on my own anymore.  Why would I need to do anything?  I have a 
servant to do things for me.  Thus, I become dependant on the servant.  Another loss that 
I have received is that my original plan was to fight the Other in order to make the Other 
recognize me.  What is the point of a mere servant recognizing me?  I do not have 
recognition; I simply have a “yes-man” on my hands.  “The master is master only 
because he is recognized by the slave; his autonomy depends on the mediation of 
another self-consciousness, that of the slave.  Thus his independence is completely 
relative.”14  We started off as equals, and now “the master finds that the recognition he is 
getting is not from an equal.  Recognition from an equal is the only recognition worth 
having, and he cannot have it, because he has made the slave his inferior.”15  This is not 
                                                 
12
 Hyppolite, 171. 
13
 Hegel, 116. 
14
 Hyppolite, 173. 
15
 Rauch, 98. 
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another self, but has been reduced to a thing, an object; and I do not want another object 
as my mirror of my self, only an other self can do that.  The servant, on the other hand, 
learns how to make things.  The servant can do things by herself.  Even though I am still, 
in a sense, in control, the servant has learned to make and control things.  In a sense, the 
servant will realize that she has put work into this object.  But as a result, my sense of 
selfhood suffers.  “Instead of the truth of self-certainty, he is aware that in receiving 
recognition from someone who is now his inferior, his own consciousness and action are 
now unessential and ungenuine.  The victory is hollow.”16 
 What the servant gains is control of the outcome in a sense.  Since I am stuck and 
in a sense, stagnant, the only way to move forward is through the servant.  Only through 
the servant can we move forward and complete this whole dialectical process.  Thus for 
Hegel, “[i]f history must be complete, if absolute knowledge must be possible, it is only 
the slave who can do it, by attaining satisfaction.  And that is why Hegel says that the 
‘truth’ (revealed reality) of the master is the slave.  The human ideal, born in the master, 
can be realized and revealed, can become Wahrheit (truth), only in and by slavery.”17  
The truth comes through the servant.  “[T]he slave will invent history, but only after the 
master has made humanity possible.”18 
 The problems from Hegel are eventually solved.  Eventually, the servant will 
reach the capacity to reason in which it realizes that it is part of a unity but also realizes 
that there are different individuals.  Consciousnesses can be shared through their 
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 Ibid. 
17
 Kojève, 56. 
18
 Kelly, 174. 
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language, history and culture.  It works its way to the end where consciousness reaches 
the most complete and robust from of conscious life where it takes on a manner of 
knowing: Absolute Knowledge, the final form of conscious life.  It is with Absolute 
Knowledge where everything is complete and an end, a telos to consciousness.  But what 
shall we think of this ending?  Is it too optimistic?  Sartre seems to think so: there are 
two forms of optimism that Sartre accuses Hegel of committing.  Sartre sees Hegel’s 
view only for self-consciousness and reinterprets it for human existence.  Let me now 
switch to Sartre’s view to see how his view of consciousness (and other people, for that 
matter) are different from Hegel, yet there is a sense that there are obvious influences 
from Hegel. 
For Sartre, his problem comes down to existential freedom.  We see ourselves in 
our own facticity (what we are) as opposed to our transcendence (what we would like to 
be).  We can define ourselves and what we want to become.  However, when other 
people enter the picture, we are always changing our lives for them.  Other people want 
us to behave and act a certain way.  Thus, we define ourselves not just to our own terms, 
but to other people’s terms as well.  We are thrown into this new existence and redefine 
ourselves according to the new people around us.  We redefine ourselves according to 
people whom we admire, whom we identify with, and even people we despise.  As the 
Other sees me, he judges me, puts labels on me, categorizes me, and thereby limits me.  
It is “the look” as Sartre puts it because with this look, the Other casts my transcendence 
into a transcended facticity.  I become a “transcendence-transcended.”  My being-in-the-
world is given to the Other through the look.  Through the look, my possible projects 
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cease; my possible projects are a “subtle death.”  In this sense, I am aware of my own 
body as other people perceive it.  I become fully aware of myself only when I am aware 
that I am there as another object for someone else.  Yet, this is different from Hegel.  For 
Sartre, he carries the Cartesian sense of a distinction between the body (or as Sartre puts 
it, Being-in-itself) and consciousness (being-for-itself).  However, there is a third 
category that we must consider: other people.  I may be conscious of myself just by 
being aware of other things being distinct from me, but “I become fully self-conscious. . . 
by becoming aware that I am in object, an active body, for someone else’s perception—
only when I become aware that I am being looked at.”19  By being looked at (say 
through a keyhole, for example, as Sartre did), we feel embarrassed when we are caught.  
And when we are embarrassed, we are self-conscious.  These relationships with these 
new people are not being-with-Others, but being-for-Others.  We are not with other 
people; we are for them. This look reduces me to an object for the Other.  The Other sees 
me as body, a thing in the world.  In other words, I gain self-consciousness by 
objectifying myself.  But I recognize this objectification through the eyes of other 
people.  By being looked at, I am no longer master of the situation.  The Other has 
control and limits my freedom because the Other sees me, makes predictions, judging 
me, and putting labels on me.  I am not what I am, because the Other has made me.  The 
Other destroys my freedom and negates me by her look.  I am possessed by her.  An 
example is from No Exit where there are some moments where one can see certain ways 
where the self is given to the Other where the Other manipulates us, thus limiting our 
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freedom.  Starting with Garcin himself, he seems to be getting along well at the 
beginning of the play.  In fact, he later states in the play that he would rather live alone20 
than to have company.  However, Inez enters and now it is Inez and Garcin sizing each 
other up.  Even at the beginning of their introduction, Inez mentions how grotesque 
Garcin’s mouth is: it twitches so.21  Here, one could see the revolting humanness from 
Inez’ point of view.  Taken from the main character’s point of view from another of 
Sartre’s work Nausea, the human bodily existence is nauseating.  It comes to the point 
where as soon as something is pointed out to you (either by “the look” or some 
verbalization) then one becomes aware22 of oneself as an object.   
Thus, I am just another object in the world of the Other.  I must defend myself: I 
then try to turn the Other into an object: I must negate my objectification by objectifying 
the Other.  I try to possess the other by making her an object: her in-itself becomes part 
of my experience because I can only encounter her as a body, never across her 
subjectivity.  Likewise, she can only see my body and never come across my 
subjectivity.  By this, I look back at her where I steal her subjectivity, her freedom 
simply by staring.23  This new conflict then becomes a struggle for my sense of my own 
freedom, and the sense of my self by another person; I want the Other to recognize my 
freedom, but the Other has expectations, different plans, or desires me to do something 
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else.  In a sense, the Other restricts and interferes with my opinions of myself.  Thus, 
recognition is frustrated.  
 So when it comes to love, I see the Other and realize that the Other has being-
for-itself.  This means that the Other also has freedom.  Yet, to maintain our freedom, we 
can only do so at the expense of capturing the Other’s freedom.  If I love the person, I 
limit the Other’s freedom.  Likewise, if the Other loves me, then I lose my freedom as 
well.  For Sartre, one must wonder why anyone would want to give up their freedom.  
Indeed, Ortega y Gasset claims that love is surrendering the self to another.24  This is 
what love does: it objectifies the Other not by taking away her freedom (by killing the 
Other), but by capturing it, which makes her into a slave and obviously (despite what 
wishful thinking one wants to have) we do not want a slave for a lover; we want the 
Other to have some selfhood, some freedom.  After all, I want the Other to love me 
freely.  How can the other love me freely if I have possessed her freedom?  What I want 
to do is to possess not the Other as a thing, but as a free person, as a consciousness.  But 
as soon as I do that, I have possession of her freedom, which is no longer love.  How 
could the Other love me if I have control over her?  “[H]ow can the beloved be a free 
person if I possess and enslave her freedom?”25 
On the other hand, if I give the Other freedom, I have lost possession of the 
Other.  Hence, I will lose the ontological safety of my mastery over her.  The Other must 
proclaim a certain restriction on what one can do to master me (“if you loved me, you’d 
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do what I want”).  And since we cannot bear to lose our love, we are willing to do a 
tradeoff in order to keep our love.  Freedom is a price we pay to fall in love, yet we 
cannot love unless we have freedom.  The contradiction lies in wanting the Other to be a 
free consciousness since I want the Other to view me objectively; but I do not want the 
Other to have a free consciousness because I want to rule her freedom.  It is the paradox 
of two becoming one, but still trying to remain two26: no one can be free and possessed. 
However, the drawback is that we do not want the Other to have too much 
individuality; likewise, the Other does not want to give us too much individuality.  In 
other words, the lover and the beloved do not want to give too much freedom to one 
another.  By capturing the Other’s freedom, I want to enslave the Other as free because 
only this will satisfy me.  However, if she is free, she will escape my possession of him.  
When this happens, I have lost mastery over the Other.  The balance of freedom and love 
is instable. 
Think of friendship.  With friends, we are thrown into a situation where we just 
happen to be with friends with him or her.  However, contrary to popular belief, we do 
not become friends because we happen to like him or her which is the common way of 
looking at friendship; we are friends with him or her in order to get a conception of 
ourselves.  We then form a partnership.  With friends, we have as many as we want.  In 
fact, we may use the word “friend” in a promiscuous way (we call someone our friend 
because we met them once, or our friend is friends with him or her).  Our friends define 
us.  Since we have many friends, our identity is spread out to many and we do not 
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depend on one friend on how we think of ourselves.  For lovers, it is different because in 
our society, we think of lovers as an exclusive partnership.  For Sartre, this cannot work.  
We want to expand our identity and options by having as many lovers as possible 
because our freedom would be limited if we restricted ourselves to just one person. 
Love is not a selfless act; love is a seduction to manipulate/dominate the Other 
because to control the Other, to master and possess the Other, we use modes of 
seduction.  Think of the beginning of a relationship or even a first date.  Our thinking is 
not based on having a good time with the Other, but rather how can I win the Other.  We 
can do this by surrendering ourselves to the Other as a roundabout way of possessing the 
Other.  It is an impression act.  We act in order to get the Other to think of us in a certain 
way.  In turn, the Other does the same.  We ask certain questions (where did you go to 
school? what do you study?) not to get to know the Other, but to find new openings, to 
find new ways to present ourselves which appeals to the Other.  I try to make myself 
into a fascinating object.  Our weapons are not to kill each other to the death; rather, our 
weapons are “the look”, certain vocabularies, and the caress.  We can see this again in 
No Exit when Garcin and Estelle start to make love, Inez jumps in and questions Garcin 
if Estelle really loves him.  After all, Estelle wants a man but she will say anything to get 
that man.  At the same time, Garcin feels like a coward and he wants some reassurance 
that he is not a coward.  But how can he be sure that when Estelle is telling him that he is 
not a coward, is she really telling the truth, or is that something that he just wants to hear 
so that she can get what she wants?   
INEZ:  And you, Estelle, do you like cowards? 
ESTELLE:  If you knew how little I care!  Coward or hero, it’s all one 
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provided he kisses well. [. . .] [To Garcin] Why trouble what those men 
are thinking?  They’ll die off one by one.  Forget them.  There’s only me, 
now. 
GARCIN:  But they won’t forget me, not they!  They’ll die, but others will 
come after them to carry on the legend.  I’ve left my fate in their hands.27 
 
But after a while, Sartre’s problem with love is that we must give up our freedom 
and take away the Other’s freedom in order to create this new self.  It is an unsuccessful 
attempt at dominating the Other, while the Other unsuccessfully attempts to dominate us.  
By surrendering herself to me, she has already self-destructed her freedom and has 
become my slave.  Yet this is not what I want because I want to be loved by a freedom.  
We cannot completely give up our individuality to create this new self, we want some 
aspects of individuality too.  After all, I want to be a fascinating subject, not a 
fascinating object.  How can we do this?  For it is a contradiction to be free and 
possessed at the same time as well as possessing her freedom and identity.  For Sartre, 
love–and more importantly, sexual desire–is taking away the Other’s subjectivity and 
transcending it into objectivity.  Ironically, the Other consents to this.  As with Hegel, 
there is a “struggle unto death” where there are obvious master-servitude themes except 
for Sartre there is no end.  As Lavine puts it, “the conflict between master and slave is a 
no-win game”28 for Sartre.  What can we do?  We cannot kill the Other for we would 
lose the Other as a mirror to ourselves who would then lose our being-for-others.  On top 
of that, I would also lose the satisfaction of enslaving the Other.  Possibly, once the 
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Other realizes that she is a slave, she will rebel and struggle to regain her freedom which 
will result in a conflict to which we start over again.  What does Sartre then conclude?  
Love is an impossibility.   
First, how can the other obtain subjectivity and objectivity at the same time?  
Second, how can one have individuality but still have a shared self?  That’s a 
contradiction in terms.  To share a self is to give up one’s freedom.  Indeed, Sartre 
makes the claim that love—and all relationships—are just conflict.  Why try to reach the 
ideal shared sense of self in love if that ideal is impossible?  Even if one strives for it, it 
is all conflict. 
Love is really a device to make the other people love us.  Because fascination is a 
transcending project, we would rather be loved than to love.  However, I cannot force 
the Other to love me.  Even if I could, it would not be a free love.  The best I could do is 
make the Other think of me in impressionable terms: I manipulate the Other by hiding 
my subjectivity by making her believe that I am a fascinating object.  This fails, 
however:  once I have become an object, my objectivity has no meaning for me.  I have 
already lost my freedom by making myself objectified.  Once again, we can see it in No 
Exit when Estelle enters the play.  Immediately we can tell that Inez is attracted to 
Estelle.  Sartre wants to point out that winning the Other is a way to manipulate the 
Other.  Inez wants to manipulate Estelle into thinking that Inez is actually a favorable 
person as a person, lover, and possibly as a woman.  At this point, Inez puts up a form of 
seduction to win Estelle: Inez flirts with Estelle.  Through this process, Inez’ project is to 
consume Estelle, to make Estelle love her.  However, Estelle does not even notice her: 
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INEZ:  You’re very pretty.  I wish we’d had some flowers to welcome you 
with. 
ESTELLE:  Flowers?  Yes, I loved flowers.  Only they’d fade so quickly here,  
wouldn’t they?  It’s so stuffy. . .  
 
Estelle does not even realize what Inez is doing; Estelle cannot see the flirtation which 
makes Inez’ project frustrated.  Inez can only give up (which would entail that love fails) 
or flirt “harder” which would be to increase the seduction level.  However, she loses 
(because Garcin “wins”29) and so her project has failed. 
 Another reason for failure is that if my seduction works, the Other will then treat 
me as an object and can never get beyond that.  In No Exit, Garcin gets his reassurance 
from Estelle and they proceed to love each other, until Inez gets in the way: 
 
INEZ:  That’s right!  That’s right!  Trust away!  She wants a man—that far you 
can trust her—she wants a man’s arm round her waist, a man’s smell, a 
man’s eyes glowing with desire.  And that’s all she wants.  She’d assure 
you you were God Almighty if she thought it would give you pleasure. 
GARCIN: Estelle, is this true?  Answer me.  Is it true? 
ESTELLE:  What do you expect me to say? . . . I’d love you just the same, even 
if you were a coward.  Isn’t that enough?30 
 
Of course for Garcin, it is not enough.  He really wants to believe that he is not a 
coward.  Indeed, Garcin will love anyone who says that he is brave in a much similar 
vain how Estelle will say anything just to get a man. 
In a way, “I love you” means “I want you to love me.”  “I want you to love me” 
means “I want you to want me to love you” and the cycle continues on.  Love is a 
contradiction: we cannot be free and possessed simultaneously for that would be an in-
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itself-for-itself or as Sartre puts it, “a desire to be God.”  I want to “ground my 
existence” in a solid way.  To do this, I must give my life meaning and I do this by 
giving my meaning onto another person.  Yet, I also want to be free, but both of these 
are impossible.  I am a hostage to the Other’s view of me, but at the same time I do 
everything I can to control that view.  I want someone to affirm me and make my life 
meaningful.  At the same time, we go through a period of bad faith because we do not 
(momentarily?) realize that the other person is trying to find meaning too.  In an attempt 
to find love, all I find are people trying to make their lives meaningful through me.  By 
giving our freedom to the Other, we would like to hear what we want to hear: 
 GARCIN: . . . Well, Estelle, am I a coward? 
 ESTELLE:  How can I say?  Don’t be so unreasonable, darling.  I can’t put 
myself in your skin.  You must decide that for yourself. 
 GARCIN [wearily]: I can’t decide. 
 
Of course Estelle cannot truly know whether Garcin is a coward or not, but Garcin wants 
to hear that he is not a coward.  He cannot simply tell her to tell him that he is not a 
coward, otherwise that would defeat the purpose of knowing what the Other already 
knows what one wants to hear.   
Love, then, becomes a strategy, a struggle for self-identity, and never a 
“merging” of selfs between the self and the Other to form a new self.  If the Other feels 
like his freedom is threatened, I quickly transcend into an object so that I am no threat to 
the Other’s freedom.  Me-as-object now has a meaning for her.  I give her meaning 
because I “hold a secret: the secret to what the Other is.”31  However, I am an object.  By 
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my seducing, I have lost my freedom.  The tables have turned and I have become her 
slave.   
Love—or relationships—are bound to fail, because they lead to five things.  First 
masochism: I transcend myself into an object for the Other and suffer for it by letting the 
Other enslave me.  When Inez attracts Estelle once more, Estelle claims that she will not 
fall for Inez’ tricks, and besides, Estelle is a muddied soul: 
INEZ:  Come to me, Estelle.  You shall be whatever you like: a glancing 
stream, a muddy stream.  And deep down in my eyes you’ll see yourself just 
as you want to be.32 
 
It also fails because my lover does not want an object for a lover.  By recognizing 
that I am the slave, I rebel viciously to recover my freedom back.  For this to truly work, 
I force the Other to look at me as an object, by making her transcendence focus on me.  
But it does not work because I cannot force someone to be free.  By letting myself 
become flesh, the Other helps to realize my facticity by using me as nothing more.  As 
an object, I must know everything I can to fascinate the Other, but that is impossible.  
Thus, masochism ends in failure. 
The second is sadism: I am the master and have control of the Other through 
threats and violence, thus I turn the Other into an object.  I refuse to be incarnated and I 
try to capture the Other’s facticity.  I want no reciprocity for I want immediate 
appropriation of the Other.  I want the Obscene which is an ungracefulness.  I do this by 
taking away her grace.  Grace, for Sartre, is the body appearing “as a psychic being in 
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situation.”33  The body orients itself toward the future by doing movements that gives 
meaning from previous movements.  It is an elegant movement and it appears natural 
with its environment.  The supreme test of gracefulness is the nude body where the 
subtle movements of the nude hide the exposed flesh.  By making the other obscene, I 
strip her actions away from grace and treat her as an instrument.  By taking away grace, 
there is a break in the elegance and the flesh suddenly appears where the parts of the 
body are not part of the totality, but instead isolated folds of flesh.  Revealing the flesh 
makes her transcend her transcendence by making her mechanical.  However, it fails as 
well because I do not want an object for a lover.  I command the Other, but it is not 
enough for me to treat her like this.  I want the Other to treat herself like this too.  I want 
her to see herself as flesh the way I see her as flesh.  I want her to see herself as object, 
as a transcendence-transcended.  This fails because even if the Other “breaks down” and 
does recognize me the way I want her to, she “breaks” because she chose to do so at that 
time.  It was not my choice for her to choose freely to deny her own freedom.  With 
sadism, I want to appropriate the Other’s freedom.  But even she must consent to that.  
She can freely choose to give up her freedom, but that was what I wanted in the 
beginning.  I wanted to capture her freedom by using her as an instrument, but the more I 
do this, the more freedom escapes from me.  How so?  The Other can also give me “the 
look.”  By looking at me, I know that she still has freedom.  Thus, I have not captured 
her freedom completely.  As we shall see, sadism can turn into desire.  Sadism is 
hopeless because I appropriate the Other’s flesh but I treat it as simply an object.   
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The third is indifference.  I try to eliminate the subjectivity of the Other.  But it 
also fails because we can never be indifferent to a previous lover no matter how hard we 
try.  Even if never again speak to a previous lover, the memories are still there and the 
personality and actions of the self are partly due to the outcome from the previous lover.  
I am what I have become because of her and I cannot ignore that fact.  I cannot pretend 
to be a solipsist.  Indeed, even if we could treat other people as if they were objects in 
the world, we eventually get sucked into their vortex of subjectivity.  Their look 
threatens me without me knowing it.  Even when Garcin suggests that each character 
stays in their respective corner and treat each other indifferently, it fails because 
someone must break the silence.34  That person will always be significant and cannot go 
back into the realm of “the rest of the people.”  I cannot be indifferent even when I try to 
ignore the Other.  Again, the play is a good example: 
INEZ:  To forget about the others?  How utterly absurd!  I feel you there, in 
every pore.  Your silence clamors in my ears.  You can nail up your 
mouth, cut your tongue out—but you can’t prevent your being there.  Can 
you stop your thoughts?  I hear them ticking away like a clock, tick-tock, 
tick-tock, and I’m certain you hear mine.  It’s all very well skulking on 
your sofa, but you’re everywhere, and every sound comes to me soiled, 
because you’ve intercepted it on its way.  Why, you’ve even stolen my 
face; you know it and I don’t!  And what about her, about Estelle?  
You’ve stolen her from me, too; if she and I were alone do you suppose 
she’d treat me as she does? No.35   
 
In the same vain, Estelle and Garcin are about to make love while Inez is watching.  
Estelle tells Garcin to simply ignore her because Inez is nothing36, yet Garcin cannot 
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because he needs Inez to convince her that he is not a coward.  By Others looking at me, 
I am led to anxiety and the only way to escape anxiety is to treat the Other into an 
instrument, thus destroying indifference toward the Other. 
 The fourth is hatred.  By having a robust concern of the Other, it smothers the 
Other.  I am no longer a lover, but have become a paternalistic being that always 
watches out for the Other.  But because of this, the Other starts to resent me.  But hatred 
fails too because even though we may want to harm or kill the Other, we would not be 
able to recover our own being.  For hatred, we do not wish to have a union with the 
Other.  I do not just hate her freedom, but just the simple fact of her existing makes me 
hate her.  However, what my underlying plan is to not only seek the death of the Other, 
but to seek out my for-itself totally free from Others.  Yet this fails.  Even by killing all 
Others, they survive in my memory as someone whose subjectivity I could not 
subjugate.  Even if my being-for-others is eliminated, I would still be known eternally as 
a being-that-had-been-for-others. 
The fifth and last feature is sexual desire.  This is almost sadism but there are 
more implications with sexual desire.  However, this could be applied to sadism.  For 
sexual desire, Sartre views the caress as the weapon for incarnating the Other into flesh.  
Much like seduction, the caress makes the Other a “transcendence-transcended.”  With 
sexual desire, my original attempt is to get hold of the Other’s subjectivity in her 
objectivity.  I can do this through the caress.  Language is to seduction what the caress is 
to sex.  What this means is that when I experience something, I experience my body as 
an extension of my consciousness.  I use this to achieve certain goals (writing with my 
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pen, walking to the grocery store, selecting certain tools).  In sexual desire, however, I 
experience my body as a “tingling-mass of sensations, sensations which I savor in the 
way a gourmet savors fine food.”37  Thus, I do not experience my body as an instrument 
in sexual desire; I experience it as “pure facticity.” 
In sexual desire, there is a “clogging of consciousness.”  In particular, when I 
desire the Other’s body, I am allowing myself to be “swallowed up in” my own body.  I 
cannot annihilate my facticity into future projections.  I “trouble” my consciousness by 
making it muddy which makes it no longer flying toward the future.  Consciousness 
chooses itself as body.  I make myself flesh—facticity—in the presence of the Other in 
order to appropriate the Other’s flesh—her facticity.  By doing this, I can incarnate the 
Other by the caress, by means of seducing the Other.  Through incarnation, I have 
transcended her transcendence: consciousness makes itself body.  However, the caress is 
a double feature which applies to me too for “the caress is not a simple stroking; it is a 
shaping.”38  I have transcended my transcendence by desiring the Other’s body and as a 
result, our consciousnesses are muddied because my physical sensation invades my 
consciousness.  My goal for the caress is to make her aware of her body as what I have 
done with my body: make her aware of her body as “pure facticity.” 
Through the incarnation, we make each other “all object,” by caressing the 
objects which are most fleshy and least free: breasts, thighs, stomach, buttocks.  The 
Other does this to me as well which furthers my incarnation.  Thus, caressing spirals 
individuals into an ongoing objectification.  Possession is a double reciprocal 
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incarnation; it is a mutual seduction.  I must incarnate myself because to make the Other 
sexually desire me, I must offer myself to the Other something which is non-threatening, 
meaningful, and an object of gratification: in short, I must become an object so that I 
may be in a position to possess the Other, I can then grasp her freedom while her body is 
being transcended.  Yet through this objectification, my own desires grow as a result of 
the caress (both mine and hers) which reduces my freedom.  Because of this, I now view 
the Other as an object of lust rather than as a freedom to be captured as I originally 
planned.39  Thus, sexual desire is doomed to failure in the same reasons as love does 
because sexual activities means deriving pleasure for one’s own body and/or 
appropriating the Other’s body.  My original plan was to grasp the Other’s freedom 
through the caress.  But because the caress incarnates her consciousness into an 
objective facticity, I cannot ensnare her freedom within this facticity.  “Such is the 
impossible ideal of desire: to possess the Other’s transcendence as pure transcendence 
and at the same time as body. . .”40  For example, “we” may have a “mutual” desire for a 
completion of orgasm or ejaculation, but when “we” are finished, I am left with nothing 
except embracing an object.  The failure of desire can lead to either sadism or 
masochism.  Thus, all “normal” sexual activity is sado-masochistic because it oscillates 
between sadism and masochism.  So in love, I want to capture a person’s freedom; in 
sex, I want to focus on the person’s body and gain possession of it.  Yet I am also body 
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confronting a body.  And because she is all body, all object, “she escapes me with all her 
transcendence. . . what I take in my hands is something else than what I wanted to 
take.”41  Love ends up in conflict and throughout the cycle, love goes through these 
stages.  It may go through all of them, perhaps just one of them, but Sartre’s point is that 
love leads to disastrous results where at least someone’s freedom is limited.  Is there an 
ordering that the lover and beloved goes through?  No.  As Sartre states, “[e]verything 
which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well.”  It is 
completely arbitrary which attitude we examine first.  We should not confuse this by 
thinking that love has first priority over other relations.  Each attitude is the very being 
of the for-itself. 
In the end, we do not get the reconciliation as we get from Hegel.  Why is this?  
For Hegel, the self reaches to a higher level where everything is resolved.  What if there 
is no possibility of reaching this higher level?  It seems that if we are stuck at the simpler 
level, it is there that we see definitive characterization of the self.  While Hegel may 
have his synthesis, “Sartre sees the conflicts that underlie the encounter as 
irreconcilable.”42  This irreconcilableness comes from the fact that the dialectic is not 
going anywhere.  It just goes in circles.  As Rauch puts it: 
In a nutshell, according to Sartre, we can state Hegel’s view as follows: The 
statement “I am I” is a tautology, with all content drained out of it; but in 
actuality it is not a tautology at all: first, because the two occurrences of “I” have 
different meanings (as subject and object), although their reference is the same; 
second, because the statement must involve mediating intervention of another 
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self, so that I arrive at my self-consciousness via the self-consciousness of 
another.43 
 
For Sartre, Hegel uses this to explain what is going on through cognitive terms, but he 
should have used ontological or in terms of being or reality.  From the point of view of 
the self-consciousness, it is not a form of knowing but a form of being.   
What does Sartre say about the telos of Hegel?  Does human history finally a 
purpose in which we are aiming toward?  Or is this just folly?  Sartre certainly claims 
that there can be no reconciliation in the end.  Sartre’s teacher, Kojève, states that 
according to Hegel, “history will be completed at the moment when the synthesis of 
master and the slave is realized.”44  Yet, Kojève does say that the slave has a better 
understanding of the nothing because of fear of death.45  Thus, the servant internalizes 
death all the time.  Over time, the servant realizes this and begins to risk his life.  With 
this, the servant develops and is disciplined while the master is soft.  And since the 
nothing is the foundation of Being, the slave “understands himself, understands man, 
better than the master does.”46  It is through this that the servant realizes this and 
understands that it is he that will complete history, and not the master.  But Sartre does 
not see this: there is no reconciliation between two self-consciousnesses let alone all of 
human history.  To see this, it is worth quoting from Sartre:  
These two attempts which I am are opposed to one another.  Each attempt is the 
death of the other; that is, the failure of the one motivates the adoption of the 
other.  Thus there is no dialectic for my relations toward the Other but rather a 
circle—although each attempt is enriched by the failure of the other. . . But it 
should be noted that at the very core of the one the other remains always present, 
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precisely because neither of the two can be held without contradiction.  Better 
yet, each of them is in the other and endangers the death of the other.  Thus we 
can never get outside the circle.47 
 
Indeed, it is again reminded where Inez tells Garcin that she will catch Estelle, to 
Garcin’s reply: “You won’t catch anything.  We’re chasing after each other, round and 
round in a vicious circle.”48  There will never be a merging of subjectivities; it will 
always be power struggles.  The model of Sartre is detailed in Figure 2.  We can see that 
there is an ongoing game in Sartre’s model.  The arrows indicate that there is no 
stopping point and the lovers are always unstable riddled with conflict.  
Thus, there is always a switching back and forth between myself and the Other.  
There is no ending, no agreement for when “I attempt to free myself from the hold of the 
Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the other, 
the Other seeks to enslave me. . . the following descriptions of concrete behavior must 
therefore be envisaged within the perspective of conflict.  Conflict is the original 
meaning of being-for-others.”49  Thus there is never any mutual recognition.  
Recognition is always a never-ending battle.   
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Figure 2:  The Sartrean Model. Sartre follows the traditional model until the point where it becomes full 
fusion: there cannot be a full fusion because the two can never become one.  After this realization, the 
lover must subsume the Other. 
 
 
For love in particular, 
Sartre seems to render Hegel’s analysis more relevant by casting what appears to 
be the same master-slave dialectic in the context of sexual relations.  While the 
subject of Hegel’s analysis seems ambiguous, or at least problematic—World-
Spirit in general, or individual consciousness, or perhaps only precivilized 
individual consciousness—Sartre addresses himself explicitly to any and all 
sexual relationships.  According to Sartre’s reading of the master-slave dialectic 
in the context of sexual relationships, however, conflict is not only genetically 
fundamental to the structure of human relationships: it is final and irreconcilable.  
Sexual love is a project doomed to failure.50 
 
 In the end, Sartre seems to have the upper hand where there is no goal to love 
and it is forever doomed to failure.  Is there a way out?  Sartre claims that we can never 
have a consistent attitude toward the Other unless the Other is both subject and object 
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simultaneously, “as transcendence-transcending and as transcendence-transcended”51 
which is essentially impossible for Sartre.  Is there a way where we can look at each 
other as both subject and object simultaneously?  In the next chapter, I am going to 
investigate Simone de Beauvoir’s work and see how we can get out of a conflictual 
relationship. 
                                                 
51
 BN, 529. 
  
35 
CHAPTER III 
BEAUVOIR 
So much for a relationship under Sartre’s guide.  Even if there was a possibility 
of a loving relationship, it would end up in sadism or masochism, which is not what we 
tend to think love is.  Sartre’s metaphysics define being in such a way that love is 
impossible.  Yet, there is a strange irony that marks some differences between Sartre’s 
philosophy and Sartre’s life. 
In his War Diaries, he has mentioned to Beauvoir that they are “one.”  He 
mentions a fusion: “. . . it seemed as though as I was telling you my every thought, or 
rather that you were thinking it along with me. . . I was imagining two consciousnesses 
melted into one. . .”52  We could see a progression where Sartre loves Beauvoir—starting 
with someone who is not him in 193753, to where she has become “my dear little you 
who are me” in 1939.54  Again the message is that Sartre did feel love for Beauvoir: “I 
love you, you who are me [vous autre moi], most passionately;”55  “I love you with all 
my might, my little heart, you are me, you are my life;”56  “I love you with all my heart, 
and we two are one.”57  The fusion ideology has made Sartre and Beauvoir think of 
themselves as a “we”.  Is it possible that when Sartre wrote Being and Nothingness in 
1943 he changed his mind on love?  Either way, the irony is that the philosopher of bad 
faith perpetrates it.  However, there have been many controversies surrounding the 
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personal lives of Sartre and Beauvoir.  The common story is that Sartre made a pact with 
Beauvoir claiming that they were to be “essential” loves to each other but they were able 
to experience contingent lovers.  If that is the case—and we can see from history that 
they indeed did have many lovers from both individuals—that it looks they did keep 
their pact and they remained together until their deaths.  There has been some 
controversy about this pact58, but the point is is that the private love lives of Sartre and 
Beauvoir were deeply complex where the lovers involved former students, trios, and 
transatlantic relations.  Perhaps there will always be something that shall remain 
unknown in history about their private lives.  Nevertheless, the “we” that they did share 
seems to follow that they had an essential “we” and had occasional contingent “we’s” 
throughout their lives.  The fusion holds for the essential couple for they died as a “we”. 
At any rate, Sartre claims that love is an absolute but is made relative by 
Others.59  The first question is why must love be an absolute?  Making love into an 
absolute has the drawback of trying to meet that standard.  If the relationship cannot 
meet that standard, then it is not love.  Thus, Sartre makes a huge metaphysical 
assumption about love in general by taking it to be an ideal impossibility. 
In what ways does Beauvoir respond to Sartre’s view?  Through existentialism, 
there are two types of being that I mentioned in my second chapter: for-itself and in-
itself.  The former involves intentionality while the latter does not.  However, Pilardi 
offers new insight to these beings: they are gendered.  Sartre has assumed that the 
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individuals involved in love—on any relationship—are gender-free.  In other words, 
they are androgynous beings.  In a way this is understandable: proceeding from the 
Cogito, one must also doubt one’s gender.  Beauvoir, however, cannot do that.  From the 
Cogito, doubting one’s gender may make one see oneself as a neutered being which 
means gender is irrelevant.  But simply making it irrelevant still takes man as the 
absolute human type.  The term “man” is used to identify and designate humans in 
general.  So from the Cogito, there is already a male bias.  Beauvoir cannot ignore her 
senses and her phenomenological weight of being a woman. 
While Beauvoir may agree that Sartre’s description of love and sexual desire is 
true, her response is that this is bad-faith60 love.  Indeed, Morgan claims that following a 
path of patriarchal love means to love is a life of inauthenticity and even a “moral 
evil.”61  Beauvoir finds Sartre making a universal description on love where it should not 
be done.  Since he is making two concepts contradict each other—absolute freedom and 
absolute being—then love would obviously fail.  Sartre sets up his definition so that love 
is inversely proportional to Being.  Beauvoir counters this by stating that we do not have 
absolute freedom and absolute being.  To replace absolute freedom, Beauvoir calls it a 
“situation.”  To replace absolute being, Beauvoir calls it “ambiguity.”  They will both be 
explained later in this chapter.  
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Beauvoir asserts that the relationships between men and women were part of a 
“primordial Mitsein”62 which, against Sartre, relationships are not necessarily riddled 
with conflict.  Through the Hegelian master-servitude dialectic, Beauvoir sees that this is 
how people recognize the other through a mutual recognition.  Against Sartre however, 
Beauvoir believes that this is possible.63  While Beauvoir sees this reciprocal relationship 
as a way for recognition, there is still a gendered aspect which makes one sex have 
authority of the dialectic than the other:  “She opposes him with neither hostile silence of 
nature nor the hard requirement of a reciprocal recognition; through a unique privilege 
she is a conscious being and yet it seems possible to possess her in the flesh.  Thanks to 
her, there is a means for escaping that implacable dialectic of master and slave which has 
its source in the reciprocity that exists between free being.”64  From this passage, the 
person in the master-servitude dialectic is male.  Females do not have recognition.  This 
does not mean that man is the master and woman is the slave.  Woman is not part of the 
dialectic which entails that only men can be masters or slaves.  Because man is the 
essential consciousness with respect to woman, men’s relationships has been made to be 
more absolute.  It is because man has the power, he is and has always been “the defining 
Subject” while woman “is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he 
with reference to her; she is the inessential as opposed to the essential.  He is the Subject, 
he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”65  Thus woman is the absolute Other.  Man 
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compels woman to be an object—dooming her to immanence which makes her into the 
Other.  It is because of this that in The Second Sex “woman was a transcendence, forced 
to be an immanence by a patriarchal society.”66  Because of this, whenever women 
behave in a transcendent way, they are regarded as unfeminine.  Consciousness is 
gendered in this patriarchal society because man and woman cannot recognize each 
other through a Hegelian dialectic.  The “process” freezes thus resulting no reciprocity, 
no recognition.  Through this perspective, males have been associated with the moving 
transcendence while females have been associated with the static immanence.  It is 
because of this patriarchal society that men describe the world from their point of view, 
but confuse it with the absolute truth.67   
For Beauvoir, the genuine erotic experience displays an ambiguity of the for-
itself, as both subject and object for another.  However, this will not work under the 
patriarchal system because the female will always experience the self as Other, as object.  
Her erotic experience has always been an experience of passivity, of immanence.  This is 
because women are alienated from their bodies through objectification, pregnancy, and 
menstruation.68  Thus, she is frustrated to be an active individual.  Indeed, she cannot be 
and have individuality because to be an Other is to lose individuality and become a 
General.  She is a cultural object where she is not an individual female but is considered 
as “the group of women.”  Yet the female self does not have solidarity like the Jews or 
the African-Americans do according to Beauvoir.  The females live with the males and 
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so their only solidarity is with and through men.  Because woman cannot live without 
man, her loving him is an entrapment.69 
How do we escape the captivity of love?  As an existentialist, Beauvoir claims 
that women choose to be held in captivity, but they can choose to get out.  Getting out is 
not so simple however.  In the Justifications section of The Second Sex, Beauvoir 
describes the reasons why women follow certain paths as a way of justifying their 
behavior.  For the purposes of this chapter, I will be focusing on chapter XXIII: “The 
Woman in Love.”  In that chapter, Beauvoir points out what would happen if Sartre was 
right about love.  Beauvoir shows that this chapter is an application of Sartre’s 
philosophy toward a woman in love. 
In it, being in love is an irresistible ploy devised by men such that happiness for 
women is recognized as part of a man.  Through love, woman embraces her immanence.  
Beauvoir states that even the word “love” has a different sense for both sexes.70  
Through this, both sexes experience love differently as well.  According to Beauvoir, 
men see love as a way to possess the woman.  There has never been an instance where 
the man objectifies himself for the sake of the woman.  Indeed, bringing back the 
sadomasochistic terms from Sartre, Beauvoir would argue that sadism and masochism 
are not gender-neutral terms: sadism is usually reserved for the males and masochism is 
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usually reserved for the females.  However, the woman idealizes love to the point where 
she sees her beloved as an absolute god.  She tries to find herself in a man in order to 
justify herself, give her a sense of meaning, and a sense of being.  She is alienated in her 
man—the absolute Subject—by totally sacrificing herself to him.  Even if the man does 
fall in love, he is still the absolute Subject and his whole goal is possession, whereas the 
woman’s goal is to be possessed.  Since her life will forever be dependent on someone, 
she might as well serve this god rather than to obey “tyrants—parents, husband, or 
protector.”71  Thus, woman sees love as a religion, as a necessity in order to survive on 
her own.  Because man makes love mechanical, he really seeks domination more than 
fusion and reciprocity.72  “For Beauvoir, desire and the sexual union is not a 
sadomasochistic dialectic, but is more of a merging with the other. . .”.73  But once this 
union is broken—because of him—he still retains his subjectivity while the woman 
swirls more so into objectivity.  Ironically, woman lets herself be possessed, to be 
dominated, to become another object through man’s eyes because since man is a god, he 
can give her absolute value.  She does so because her destiny is marriage, which means 
to subordinate herself to her man because the man is her economic and social 
foundation. 
“A woman passionately in love usually strives to unite with a sovereign subject 
to whom she has attributed the highest value.  If she effaces herself totally before him, 
her attitude of love shifts to masochism.  Like Sartre, Beauvoir emphasizes that the other 
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wishes to be the primary object for her beloved, his absolute aim, that towards which he 
directs himself, for which he transcends himself.”74  Unlike Sartre, however, she has 
been submissive in this relationship and her individuality in the first place.  She must do 
what she can to hold on to that love. 
Part of the woman’s project, which is to love a man, makes her an empty 
individual: she eventually becomes deranged, delusional, and annoying.75  She may, at 
the beginning of her adolescence, identify herself as part of the male group in order to be 
accepted.  When society shuns that attitude, she gives up and realizes that in order to 
become part of their masculinity; she seeks to have one of them in love with her.  What 
is interesting on this account is that she wants the identification of some masculinity so 
that she can be accepted.  All men share the attribute of masculinity.  Therefore, she “is 
in love with man in general”76 and not an individual male.   
She does have standards on what to accept as a suitable lover: he must be 
superior to her.  Even if she has found someone “inferior” to her, she degrades her self to 
the point that the man can be superior to her.  She gives her future to him, thus giving 
her transcendence to him as well.  In this light, “falling in love and being loved by a 
superior being come to be seen as a desirable and liberating way of acquiring identity 
and access to power.”77  Indeed, it is why a woman falls in love in order to get an 
identity.  She does so to overcome her erotic passivity. 
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As soon as the woman is locked into love, it is very difficult to escape because of 
financial and psychological reasons.  She cannot leave because she does not have the 
resources to live on her own, nor does she want to be lonely.  Her livelihood, her 
existence, her very meaning is enslaved to her lover, her master, her god.  She 
relinquishes her independence knowingly with the knowledge of the male loving her.  
As long as the male loves her then she can yield.78  She does so by being an object of 
seduction, by being passive, thus perpetuating her objectivity.  The man will not 
relinquish his transcendence because he wants to remain active.  But because man has 
the woman, he can get rid of her easily with indifference.  He does not allow himself to 
be possessed by her.  It is she who suffers from the loss.  Until a reciprocal relationship 
happens, man does not need the reciprocity that woman demands.  He can survive on his 
own without love.  “On the day when it will be possible for woman to love not in her 
weakness but in her strength, not to escape herself but to find herself, not to abase 
herself but to assert herself—on that day love will become for her, as for man, a source 
of life and not of mortal danger.”79   
So for Beauvoir, the typical love—the Sartrean view of love—for a woman leads 
to masochism.  It is masochistic because if she does lose him, she blames herself; she 
has put all of her values onto him.  Losing him would mean losing all of her values and 
self-worth.  She does not revolt against him when in love, but rather she revolts against 
herself.80  When she starts to lose him, she sees herself as an object that is not lovable.  
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She cannot satisfy him or make him happy.  She relinquishes herself in order to have the 
fused union whereas the man—since he is Absolute—needs no union for he remains 
forever independent; “she longs to melt with him into one.”81  Since she has alienated 
herself in her man, which means she has become dependent on him, by his being there, 
his seeing her; then by losing him, by lacking him, she loses herself.82  She becomes 
dependent on him because she learns that she cannot be happy unless she is loved.  She 
will wait for this love.  Beauvoir mentions the common fairy tales that portray this 
waiting-for-love: Snow White, Sleeping Beauty, Cinderella.  These characters submit to 
their idea of love while the man goes off on adventures, being active while she passively 
waits.83  And after the man has taken her love, he has won.  “So for the lover the act of 
love is conquest, victory.”84 
 She can only gain value by bonding herself with a man.  “For woman love is a 
supreme effort to survive by accepting the dependence to which she is condemned. . .”85  
What can she do?  It is a blind faith in love and a blind obedience to her lover.  Because 
of her loss of individuality and independence, she has forgotten her self in order to fuse 
with the essential subject.  “The supreme goal of human love, as of mystical love, is 
identification with the loved one.”86  She wishes for fusion, a unification, or to go back 
to the primordial Mitsein.  Yet this unification is one-sided: she merges into him.  She 
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has lost her self into him.87  For every woman in love, “she is another incarnation of her 
loved one, his reflection, his double: she is he.  She lets her own world collapse in 
contingence, for she really lives in his.”88  There is no shared equaled self here: “when 
he says ‘we,’ she is associated and identified with him.”89  So there may be a chance to 
say that they become “one”, but it is the man who swallows up her transcendence while 
the man remains unaffected.  She lives through him through his transcendence 
vicariously. 
A way out is for man to see himself as non-absolute and woman to start seeing 
herself as absolute.  Bergoffen looks at Beauvoir and interprets that “[t]he conditions of 
the couple require that men, against the patriarchal myth, be recognized as contingent, 
and that women, in opposition to patriarchal gendering, be recognized as transcendent.  
These conditions, if realized, would undo the power of the modern romantic myth.”90   
Yet a strange thing happens: the woman later realizes that he is not God; he is a 
man.  How, they will ask, can they not see an absolute value in her lover and realize that 
he is flawed?  How can her idol be mediocre?  How can her lover—the absolute being 
that she has chosen to give over her entire being—be flawed?  This is no longer a god 
for he has fallen, but he is not a man either.  “A fallen god is not a man: he is a  
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fraud. . .”.91  She must choose between her fallen idol or herself, but it is a dilemma: “[i]f 
she wins the game, she destroys her idol; if she loses it, she loses herself.  There is no 
salvation.”92  Love, in a patriarchal culture, is a snare for a woman. 
She feels duped into thinking that he was the “one and only” for her and her 
alone but he is also a flawed human.  Thus, the woman in love is always tormented.  So 
much for the woman in love.  How can we get out of this?  Through a Beauvoirian 
analysis, she points out to Sartre that his view of love makes the woman in love 
hysterical.  The woman in love is not what authentic love is.  Indeed, Beauvoir questions 
Sartre’s view of love as sexually neutral.  
The man’s wants are limited.  As soon as he has obtained what he wants, he is 
satisfied.  However, the woman has no limits to her devotion.  She continually gives, 
even by transferring her transcendence onto him in order to preserve it.  However, she 
cannot be happy because she wishes to possess the man, but that is impossible because 
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(1954, 178; [1956] 1999, 195).  Despite the distance that grows between Henri and Paule 
throughout the book (leading to their eventual break and Paule’s plunge into derangement) Paule 
continues to insist that nothing is amiss and whatever tensions they have are cosmetic, rather than 
foundational.  Even after their split and Henri’s choice of Josette as a partner, Paule insists on 
continuing to sacrifice herself to her absolute.  (Mussett, 147, brackets are hers).  
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he is free and a free being cannot be possessed.  Because the woman gives herself to the 
man, she wants the man to give himself to her.  Instead, the woman gives herself, and the 
man simply takes.  Because of woman’s fear of being single, she engages in 
erotomania—where love becomes something greater than life itself.  Thus the divineness 
of love. 
Even if there is some sort of mutual love there is a difference of attitude.  The 
man is capable of justifying himself without her, whereas the woman sees man necessary 
to her.  Since the man does not see her as a necessary being, the woman is tortured, sees 
herself as a burden rather than a beloved.  It seems as if women find love more important 
than man and man experiences love for the fulfillment of satisfaction and desire of his 
subjectivity through this objectified Other. 
Indeed, through her jealousy of other women, the beloved cannot make friends 
with other females for the fear of her lover looking at her friends.  It is because of this 
“she must either give up making love a religion or give up loving.  This is a radical 
catastrophe and no wonder the woman in love, suspicious and mistaken in turn, is 
obsessed by the desire to discover the fatal truth and the fear that she will.”93  And from 
here, the man is quick to leave but she, in order to keep him, must suppress her pride to 
become gentle and passive again.  Her manipulation by deception keeps her man, but for 
the price of her freedom.  She then becomes a seductress by becoming the woman that 
he wishes to encounter and possess.  But it is no use: there is no reciprocity in this 
system because he receives pleasure through her, but he can give pleasure to her as well.  
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She has no say on gaining pleasure.  If the man is not satisfied, she becomes blames 
herself.  Either way, she has no say in her pleasures or it is her fault.  
However Beauvoir states that love is possible where both sexes will not be 
dominant upon the other.  For Beauvoir, “[a]n authentic love should assume the 
contingence of the other; that is to say, his lacks, his limitations, and his basic 
gratuitousness.”94  We must see each other not as absolute beings, but as ambiguity.  
Beauvoir brings in the notion of ambiguity: we are both subject and object, body and 
mind.  We recognize each other’s freedom and facticity.  “This simultaneous ambiguity 
is what we recognize in sexual activity.”95  Because of this ambiguity, we cannot tell 
where the boundaries are between subject and object.  But that is what Beauvoir wants: 
since we are part of an original Mitsein, boundaries between the individuals must be 
blurred in order to form the whole Mitsein.  Erotic activity is how humans experience 
their ambiguity toward one another.  “As embodied consciousness, we reciprocally 
recognize each other, we act with and on each other, together, we express desire.  We 
desire the other’s freedom as much as our own in erotic activity, for the other’s freedom 
is part of assertion and the denial of boundaries.  What is erotic about sexual activity is 
its expression of ambiguity.”96  Because beings are ambiguous, we can have the two 
coming into one, but they do not unite into one.  It is how we can have a union because 
the boundaries are unclear. 
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Love is given without the expectation for something in return.  To do this means 
seeing the other as contingent and not to give each other’s meaning to one another.  We 
could still recognize each other’s transcendence without sacrificing our own.  To do this, 
both individuals must realize that they are both flawed, that they are not “the one”, and 
that neither sex has an absolute value over the other.   
For love to succeed, for love between equals to be possible, woman must be able 
to transcend her self by giving up her immanence.  She must see her self—and others 
must see her—as a transcendence.  Indeed, woman may even play a dominant role in 
society.97  With true equality for both sexes, genuine love is possible.  Through this, 
authentic love is a reciprocal relationship between the sexes.  So while Sartre sees 
human relationships as an inevitable conflict, Beauvoir sees Sartre’s view inauthentic 
because one is alienating one’s freedom in the other.  In other words, Beauvoir finds 
Sartre’s view of love a bad faith version.  On Beauvoir’s view, however, the individuals 
involved should go through an “existential conversion” to realize that they can go 
beyond desire and just simply look at the person by them both mutually recognizing 
each other as they are.  They must see each other as ambiguous bodies in a situation, in a 
freedom that is situated. 
What would be authentic love according to Beauvoir?  “Genuine [that is, 
authentic] love ought to be founded on the mutual recognition of two liberties; the lovers 
would then experience themselves both as self and as other: neither would give up 
transcendence, neither would be mutilated; together they would manifest values and 
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aims in the world.  For the one and the other, love would be revelation of self by the gift 
of self and enrichment of the world.”98  What then is genuine or authentic love?  Morgan 
provides an answer: it is “mutual trust and communication.  The lovers should strive to 
be present to the other in a forthright way so that the relationship can be based on shared 
and mutual knowledge—albeit partial and open to change.”99  Mutual knowledge?  This 
is reminiscent of Hegel’s self-consciousnesses mutually knowing each other by mutually 
recognizing each other.  Is Morgan recommending that we can know each other by 
recognition?  She later states that inauthentic love would be a double illusion if there was 
no knowledge.  Other forms of inauthentic love would include dependency, fear, 
manipulation, and double-victimization.  To make love authentic, both man and woman 
need to be in the Hegelian dialectic so that they can mutually recognize each other and 
not make one master over the other.  This is what Beauvoir aims toward.   
A question remains: if Beauvoir is correct on how woman have been seen as the 
Other and only men have been part of the Hegelian dialectic, how can we accommodate 
the position of women in the Hegelian dialectic and not be considered as the Other?  In 
order for women to have reciprocal relationships, she must live authentically which 
means she must be part of history and engage in projects that demonstrates her liberty.  
She does this through work, by being active and productive.  However, the work must be 
fair.  For this, Beauvoir looks for a future under socialism.  Through this system, women 
can be fully liberated and independent, giving up the position of being the Other while 
                                                 
98
 SS, 667. 
99
 Morgan, 406.  Gothlin portrays the same idea: “[Beauvoir] maintains that authentic love is founded 
upon reciprocal recognition, friendship, generosity, and understanding” (88).  Of course, “understanding” 
could be understood as part of the Hegelian dialectic as well. 
  
51 
men give up the position of being the Absolute.  Under patriarchy however, men are 
taught to give up the bond and aim for recognition—or in Hegelian terms—aim for risk 
because that is much more important than the bond, than a shared life.  Indeed, through 
the Hegelian dialectic, asking for recognition is asking for violence: I demand 
recognition and the only recognition worth having is where it is won in combat.  I stood 
up for my recognition.  How does patriarchy see the bond?  It sees the bond as woman’s 
neediness which in turn could be interpreted as co-dependent and inferior.   
Men prefer the Hegelian reciprocity because it is “a demand for recognition and 
reads this demand as a sign of independence and autonomy.  Men are said to subordinate 
the value of the bond to the values of recognition and reciprocity because they can, it is 
said, stand on their own.  By patriarchal standards the issue is clear: no recognition, no 
relationship.  Better to break or refuse the bond.  Better to be alone, on one’s own, than 
to accept a relationship without recognition.”100  To have authentic love, the love must 
be genuine.  What does this mean?  For something to be genuine, for Beauvoir, it must 
be generous.  It is a gift and it asks nothing in return.  Here, we can see where she is 
responding harshly to Sartre’s game: where Sartre states that with gifts, we secretly want 
a gift in return, Beauvoir states that genuine gift-giving means asking nothing in return.  
For this kind of love as a gift, there is no debt, no need for an exchange.  In other words, 
the demand for recognition is lost.  In its place is the bond.  Just the mere fact of giving 
gifts, even if I do not get one in return, means that there is a bond going on.   
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What kind of union, or Mitsein, would we have for authentic love?  It is worth to 
quote Beauvoir in full: 
It is the duplicity of the husband that dooms the wife to a misfortune of which he 
complains later that he is himself the victim.  Just as he wants her to be at once 
warm and cool in bed, he requires her to be wholly his and yet no burden; he 
wishes her to establish him in a fixed place on earth and to leave him free, to 
assume the monotonous daily round and not to bore him, to be always at hand 
and never importunate; he wants to have her all to himself and not to belong to 
her; to live as one of a couple and to remain alone.  Thus she is betrayed from the 
day he marries her.  Her life through, she measures the extent of that betrayal.  
What D. H. Lawrence says of sexual love is generally valid:  the union of two 
human beings is doomed to frustration if it is an attempt at a mutual completion 
which supposes an original mutilation; marriage should be a combining of two 
whole, independent existences, not a retreat, an annexation, a flight, a remedy.  
Ibsen’s [2]Nora  understands this when she makes up her mind that before she can 
be a wife and mother she must first become a complete person.  The couple 
should not be regarded as a unit, a closed cell; rather each individual should be 
integrated as such in society at large, where each (whether male or female) could 
flourish without aid; then attachments could be formed in pure generosity with 
another individual equally adapted to the group, attachments that would be 
founded upon the acknowledgement that both are free.101 
 
The only way for liberation, the true independence is through a societal and economic 
change for the equality of women.  To have love in equality possible, woman must be 
economically independent and transcend herself without the aid of man.  Figure 3 
exemplifies that attitude of love from Beauvoir’s point of view. 
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Figure 3:  The Beauvoirian Model.  Notice that A and B start off as unequals.  As the fusion begins, B 
goes through transcendence until A and B are fully fused in which they are equal. 
 
 
 
When it is all said and done, what can we say about Beauvoir’s reply to Sartre?  
What can we say about Beauvoir’s view of love in general?  Beauvoir may have indeed 
responded well to Sartre’s view.  I have demonstrated that she shows that Sartre’s view 
is inadequate because he assumes an androgynous being.  Sartre’s view of love and 
sexuality in particular is ontological.  Beauvoir replies by stating that being is gendered 
and that there is no necessary conflict with the relationship of beings because we were an 
original couple.  After all, Beauvoir subscribes to the idea of Mitsein whereas Sartre 
rejects it.   
However, Beauvoir does have metaphysical assumptions of her own that should 
not be ignored.  Since Beauvoir accepts the Hegelian dialectic, it also assumes that she is 
accepting its androcentricity.  She states that visualizing a utopian equaled world would 
be easy because that “is what the Soviet Revolution promised:  women raised and 
trained exactly like men were to work under the same conditions and for the same 
wages.”102  On top of this, there seems to be a conflict between Beauvoir’s want of 
Mitsein and the Hegelian dialectic.  “It is no longer a question of a war between 
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individuals each shut up in his or her sphere: a caste claiming its rights attacks and is 
resisted by the privileged caste.  Here two transcendences are face to face; instead of 
displaying mutual recognition, each free being wishes to dominate the other.”103  The 
Mitsein is an ontological solidarity where the people involved have no conflicts, it is a 
relationship of we; whereas the Hegelian dialectic is conflictual by its very nature, it has 
no “we” but simply a relationship between me and the Other.  The Mitsein has no 
opposition, it is simply interdependence; whereas in the Hegelian dialectic, one is 
declared the winner.  How can Beauvoir have both?  How can there be equality if there 
are power struggles?  Is it possible for women and men to be equals if reciprocal 
recognition is based on a balance of power?  Sartre answers with a resounding no; 
Beauvoir would like to say yes, but I do not see how this is possible. 
How could we freely recognize each other’s transcendence without sacrificing 
the other if she subscribes to Hegel’s dialectic?  If love is a gift that should be given 
freely, whence comes the dialectic?  How is there reciprocity if the gift is taken but there 
is not a gift given back in return?  It seems that if she is continuously giving, and he is 
constantly receiving, she would eventually lose.  It may be possible that Beauvoir is 
arguing for both individuals to give.  But if they are constantly giving, who is doing the 
receiving?  While Sartre objectifies the Other, Beauvoir “subjectifies” the other person 
by only seeing the transcendence, only action, only freedom.  She may ask for ambiguity 
and situation, she may want the idea of people meeting each other to recognize each 
other’s limits, by seeing each other as subject and object, but she still upholds the ideal 
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of two subjects—meaning transcendences—meeting each other for authentic love.  Yet 
transcendence is a term that she describes to man.  It seems, then, that Beauvoir is asking 
woman to transcend, to be like men.  After all, she labels man as transcendence and 
woman as immanence, yet she claims that having transcendence is being authentic while 
being immanent is inauthentic.  Going for the spiritual transcendence is making man the 
standard on which one should aim for.  It is the prerequisite that for equality to happen, 
women should obtain the same rights as men.  One could interpret this as women should 
be like men: in order to be free, a woman must enter into a man’s world.  Indeed, 
Beauvoir complains that “in a male supremacist culture these criteria of evaluation are 
seen, both by the woman in love and the culture at large, as the only standards of 
evaluation worth employing.”104  If only lovers would “assume the ambiguity with a 
clear-sighted modesty, correlative of an authentic pride, they would see each other as 
equals and would live their erotic drama in amity.”105  Unfortunately Beauvoir does not 
offer a way on how to do this.  Even Morgan states that she cannot see Beauvoir’s 
solution perfect and that love is formed out of both good and bad elements. 
Many feminists have claimed that Beauvoir fails to mention the body and nature 
as an important distinction.  Beauvoir also states that motherhood is an inauthentic way 
because it is still an immanent project: there is no history-making.106  However feminists 
complain that Beauvoir has forgotten the productive elements of reproduction.  
Transcendence—freedom—is the goal but that goal is the goal for man.  Motherhood 
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and domestic labor are regarded as immanence where the woman cannot obtain value 
because it is non-productive and non-creative.  Beauvoir sets up her definitions of 
transcendence and immanence for transcendence equating with male occupations.  Thus, 
feminists argue that she has been downplaying the feminine because Beauvoir glorifies 
male occupations and diminishes females ones: 
Beauvoir associates immanence with nature, the body and its processes, and 
transcendence with culture, the spiritual and consciousness, in line with dualistic 
western philosophy.  The recurrence of this dualism in Beauvoir’s thinking has 
been severely criticized by feminist thinkers [17].   Beauvoir belittles the body and 
nature, which she sees as subordinate to consciousness and culture. . . At the 
same time as Beauvoir describes preventing the transcendence of another as 
morally wrong, she also describes the life of men as transcendent and glorifies it 
at the expense of the life of women. . . transcendent men appear authentic even as 
they oppress women.107   
 
Woman should also have that same goal to live authentically, but Beauvoir looks 
at freedom differently than Sartre.  “Accordingly, Simone de Beauvoir’s interpretation of 
the freedom of a prisoner is somewhat different from Sartre’s.  To her, a prisoner cannot 
bring his freedom to positive realization if he cannot put it into action and provide it with 
a content; for example, by revolting.  If not, in such a situation, freedom can only remain 
negative, and the sole choice is to reject the entire situation—for example, through 
suicide.”108  For Beauvoir, there is no absolute freedom that Sartre has.  Beauvoir’s 
notion is a limited freedom which she calls a situation.  One can be free according to a 
situation (cultural, historical, personal, social) and our freedom is limited when other 
factors limit us in what we do.  Each person is in his or her own situation because each 
person engages in his or her own projects.  Our freedom grows and develops over time.  
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We are constrained and limited, yet not determined according to the context of our 
situation.  This also helps Beauvoir’s reply to Sartre that we can obtain another person’s 
freedom because it is not an ideal, absolute freedom.     
As part of Sartre’s androgyny, he claims that subject and object are ahistorical 
and asocial categories whereas Beauvoir believes that they are conceptual and historical.  
According to Beauvoir, women have historically been deemed as the object without an 
easy escape route.  Woman can know herself only as an other; “her pour-autrui, her 
being-for-others, is confused with her very being.”109  Woman’s pour-autrui is more real 
than her pour-soi for “[w]omen are still, for the most part, in a state of subjection.  It 
follows that woman sees herself and makes her choices not in accordance with her true 
nature in itself, but as man defines her.  So we must first go on to describe woman such 
as men have fancied her in their dreams, for what-in-men’s-eyes-she-seems-to-be is one 
of the necessary factors in her real situation.”110  Beauvoir claims that women know 
more about the feminine world than men do because women have their roots in it.111  
This suggests that she is holding onto the idea of the eternal feminine. 
Beauvoir also fails to provide how women can get out of the repressive scheme 
so that they can have a reciprocal relationship with men.  Perhaps men are to blame too, 
but Beauvoir never gives us a prescription for a way out.  Some solutions she provides, 
however, are modeled on a masculine framework.  “Her model is the Kojèvian-Marxist 
throughout:  demands for recognition, requiring participation in productive work and 
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control of childbearing.  Thus, in Beauvoir’s philosophy, women have to adopt a male 
model of work and participation in the public sphere in order to achieve liberation.”112  
Beauvoir’s claims that for equality to work, women must enter the workforce; but surely 
something more must happen for equality to happen than that. 
Beauvoir’s claim to liberation does not stem from the relations between men and 
women, however.  “For Beauvoir, everyone is equally metaphysically capable of 
freedom.  However, women are situated in ways that make it less likely that they can act 
on their freedom. . . Femininity is a situation.”113  It is a socio-historical situation.  For 
Beauvoir, this entails that in order to change the dynamics between men and women, we 
must change the socio-historical situation right now.  Through this, women will be able 
to have a sense of transcendence.  We can see that for Sartre, transcendence was a 
descriptive concept, whereas it was a normative concept for Beauvoir.  She also speaks 
of generosity and love as a gift as a reply to Sartre, but Sartre could easily reply that to 
give a gift, one secretly wants one too and I do not see how Beauvoir could reply back.  
Beauvoir still holds on the utopian dream of the unification of the lovers coming into 
one.  But how?  Even if two never unites into one, and if Beauvoir recommends the 
Hegelian dialectic, this goes back to Sartre. 
Despite all this, to claim that Beauvoir is simply a female version of Sartre 
seriously underlies historical scholarship.  Indeed, Fullbrook and Fullbrook have 
challenged the assumption that Beauvoir was a shadow of Sartre by looking at 
posthumously published war diaries and letters.  They argue that Beauvoir’s She Came 
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to Stay (1943), which was thought to have been an application of Sartre’s philosophy in 
Being and Nothingness (1943), had actually been thought out and written before Sartre 
started writing his magnum opus.  Indeed, Simons agrees with Fullbrook and 
Fullbrook’s conclusion by looking at Beauvoir’s diary in 1927, before Beauvoir met 
Sartre.  Simons conclusion matches what Fullbrook and Fullbrook have shown:  
“Indeed, many of the philosophical ideas credited as originating with Sartre’s essay, 
including the theory of relations with the Other, did not appear in Sartre’s journal and 
other writings until after he had read the second draft of Beauvoir’s novel.”114  She has 
made improvements over Sartre’s view by viewing beings as gendered.  Yet, even if she 
critiques the idea of men and women becoming the same115 (where the same makes man 
the norm), she does move forward in looking at differences as a way to escape the 
burden or women:  
To emancipate woman is to refuse to confine her to the relations she bears to 
man, not to deny them to her; let her have her independent existence and she will 
continue non the less to exist for him also: mutually recognizing each other as 
subject, each will yet remain for the other an other.  The reciprocity of their 
relations will not do away with the miracles—desire, possession, love, dream, 
adventure—worked by the division of human beings into two separate  
categories. . .116 
 
By seeing each other mutually recognizing each other, we can tell that we will always be 
different but this difference will become a strength.  Indeed, as soon as women become 
liberated, then both man and woman can make history together: “when we abolish the 
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slavery of half of humanity, together with the whole system of hypocrisy that it implies, 
then the ‘division’ of humanity will reveal its genuine significance and the human 
couple will find its true form.”117  I will turn to Luce Irigaray in the next chapter and how 
difference—particularly sexual difference—and the couple could find a way for genuine 
love. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IRIGARAY 
 What has Beauvoir left unanswered according to Irigaray?  Beauvoir saw 
transcendence with subjectivity and immanence with the absolute Other—women.  Yet 
men, since they are the only ones that do transcend, are active because they are part of 
history.  Since women are confined to a Sisyphusain lifestyle—by living a life of 
repetition and mundane monotony—they are static and frozen, thus the immanence.  
Irigaray looks at this differently.  She sees the feminine as angels; they are a moving 
target going back and forth, the messengers that are never immobile.  The masculine, on 
the other hand, reduces things to the One.  That is “to reduce all experience, all reality to 
a fixed set of fundamental categories;”118 thus eliminating any fundamental differences 
between the sexes.   
Beauvoir has been criticized that in order for women to be truly liberated, she 
must achieve the positions of power that men have had.  “Beauvoir did little to counter 
these charges.  On the contrary, she reinforced these views, primarily by refusing to 
reply to critics, but also by suggesting, in interviews and publications that her views 
hadn’t changed since publishing The Second Sex.”119  It is worthwhile to quote from 
Léon:  
As is plain to see, the French existentialist does not speak with a single voice.  
Either she wishes to have it both ways, or she takes with one hand that which she 
gives with the other.  On the one hand, she [re]assures120 [!] her audience that 
‘boys will always be boys and girls will always be girls’; on the other, she grafts 
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a mystifying member upon her unduly castrated female.  On the other hand, she 
denies the existence of feminine qualities and values (Beauvoir 1972, 628); on 
the other, she ends up, with her back to the wall, forced to recognize the 
existence of a feminine specificity.  What kind of specificity?  Biological?  
Historical?  Positive?  Negative?  Willed?  Tolerated?  Mixed?  One never knows 
for sure.  She hesitates, goes this way and that, and, when cornered, runs to the 
masculine camp.  When all is said and done, even the residual/infinitesimal 
difference she has allowed to subsist between men and women, she is willing to 
sacrifice.  Beauvoir finds herself trapped in phallocentrism and her feminism is 
nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man and whose 
voice is that of the ventriloquist’s dummy.  Beauvoir’s women, in truth, are men, 
and men not altogether healthy.  To the spur/ious character of the endeavor could 
be applied these words of Derrida: 
 
And in truth they too are men, those women feminists . . .121 Feminism is 
nothing but the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a man.  And 
in order to resemble the masculine dogmatic philosopher this woman lays 
claim—just as much as he—to truth, scientific and objective in all their 
castrated delusions of virility.  Feminism too seeks to castrate.  It wants a 
castrated woman (1979, 65).122 
 
As far as Beauvoir is concerned, suppressing motherly desires and feminine roles is the 
way to achieve transcendence.  This is understandable from Beauvoir’s time, but later 
feminists have pointed out that this transcendence is reaching out to masculinity.  It 
never occurs to her that having feminine roles can create new values and shape a 
different perspective on what it would be like to be a woman.   
During the suffrage movement, there were reformations for equality between the 
sexes.  The aim was a sex-neutral universal where both males and females could not 
overpower another.  The hopeful outcome would be equality in the work force, equal 
pay, and the like.  In short, feminists argued for the same treatment that society gave 
men.  What Irigaray and later feminists want to point out is that the earlier feminists 
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have aspired to be like men without appreciating the differences; “the question of sexual 
difference was shelved for the moment.  The disparity between women and men could 
be rectified, the assumption was, by improving women’s situation so that it 
approximated to men’s.”123  What became emphasized was that gender roles needed to 
be displaced: women could do the same things as men could do.  To claim that we need 
to concentrate on the differences, particularly sexual differences seem to “fall back” on 
the idea that women and men have their own “natures” where feminists have struggled 
to fight against.  What Irigaray wants to do is to look at sexual difference but not 
opposed to gender.  She “sees the need to examine gender in relation to, and not in 
exclusion from, sex.”124  She wants to ask what would happen if rather than women 
trying to reach the same values as men, women seriously looked at what it means to be 
women. 
Beauvoir wanted both of the sexes to be equal: equality through economics, 
equality in the workforce, and equality through social reform.  Irigaray, however, saw 
this equality as reducing the sexes to the same.  To be equal to men is to become like 
men.  Suppose society did make it that both sexes were equal: meaning equal standards 
of living and equal rights as men.  While women would enjoy the same benefits as men, 
women would still be masquerading their femininity that has been prescribed and 
defined by the masculine.  Being equal to men is not enough for Irigaray: “women 
merely ‘equal’ to men would be ‘like them,’ therefore not women.”125  Irigaray 
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passionately disagrees with the idea of becoming equal to men and argues for 
differences, particularly sexual difference.  What is sexual difference?  Part of this 
chapter will dedicate what Irigaray means by sexual difference.  This sexual difference 
will explain her views on love.  Admittedly, Irigaray will want to say that we should see 
love in all realms of life, not just the private relationship.  For her, love forms a 
community of love which forms a better society and democracy.  While her project does 
seem worthy of analysis, my focus for this chapter will be on the private relationship 
with the individuals involved.   
 Critics often confuse Irigaray as an oppositional feminist, a feminist who argues 
to be completely different from men.  Irigaray disagrees.  To state that women should be 
totally different from men presupposes the metaphysics of the Same: the self is still 
paradigmatically masculine while the feminine remains Other.  The differences are 
eradicated and any form of difference is seen to be inferior.  Before I can analyze 
Irigaray’s concept of sexual difference, I must mention Freud and Lacan to give a brief 
understanding where Irigaray is coming from.   
Freud 
Through Freud, we have the Oedipal complex, castration anxiety, and penis 
envy.126  The young man “passes the tests” which makes him go through society without 
any neurosis.  The young girl, however, struggles harder.  Indeed, she has another “test” 
she must go through: penis envy.127  Penis envy is the idea that girls see boys having a 
penis but then realizing that she herself does not have one.  It stems from the idea that 
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the little girl has a pre-Oedipal attachment to her mother.  However, the girl finds the 
mother responsible for her lack of a penis, thus the development of penis envy.  The girl 
then hates her mother and starts to fall in love with the father because he has a penis by 
which he can provide her with it.128  The little girl believes she is living in an illusion 
because she lacks what her mother has desired.  By the young girl wanting a penis—
which means every girl has wanted a penis, it follows that the standard to follow is to 
have the penis, to be like men.  What this means is that gender has been “structured 
around the male genital system and male desire.”129  Since the young girl does not have 
the penis, she is lacking something.  But this lack is important here.  She sees herself as 
someone who is lacking from a person whom she loved (the mother) but who turned out 
to want something different.  Therefore, the girl thinks, there must be something wrong 
with me.  Eventually, girls become aware that the penis is associated with power.  Notice 
that since the females are striving to reach the penis, they are the oddities.  Therefore, 
our binary duality is men and not-men.  For Freud, women are just men lacking 
penises.130  Irigaray’s critique is that even though Freud brought to light masculinity and 
femininity in psychoanalytic parameters, something remained hidden even though it was 
a key feature in this science: sexual difference.  Yet Freud makes the masculine the 
sexual model.131  
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 Another binary distinction is since the females are lacking something, they really 
do not have a sex organ.  It is a no-thing, a nothing.  So our other binary duality is penis 
and nothing.  Looking at it again, we have: 
 Men/not-men 
 Penis/nothing 
where the former has more significance than the latter.  And so, the females are seen as 
lacking, deformed males, and incomplete.  The binary opposition became A and not-A 
as opposed to A and B.  “Instead of posing woman as –A in relation to man, defined as 
A (a logic which inevitably prioritizes the positive term), Irigaray seeks an altogether 
different space for woman, one not defined in relation to men, but in their own terms—a 
‘B’ rather than a ‘-A’.”132  However, sexual differences  
are distinguished not on the basis of (Saussurian ‘pure’) difference, but in terms 
of dichotomous opposition or distinction; not, that is, as contraries (‘A’ and ‘B’), 
but as contradictories (‘A’ and ‘not-A’).   
In relations governed by pure difference, each term is defined by all the 
others; there can be no privileged term which somehow dispenses with its 
(constitutive) structuring and value in relations to other terms.133  
  
It is a difference that is not defined to a norm—that would just be more of the same.  
Instead, difference is thought of as other, not bound to any system or structure.134  
However, there is no sexual difference because the sexes are coded by one single male 
organ: the penis.  Irigaray, however, does not want to replace the penis with the vagina 
as the privileged signifier because the vagina has been part of the silencing of woman 
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when it has been represented as a lack.  The vagina/vulva/womb has been silenced and 
written out.  The penis has been exalted as holy presence; the vagina is pure absence.  
From here, Lacan contributes his own interpretation of Freud. 
Lacan 
Irigaray has been deeply influenced by Lacan even though she rejects some of his 
views.  As Lacan did a reinterpretation of Freud, Irigaray rejects both views and has an 
interpretation using Lacanian terminology.   
To start, Lacan did not see the unconscious as some “thing” where the ego “sits.”  
In other words, the unconscious is not a “buried” conscious.  Instead, the unconscious is 
an other form of reason, logic, and rules that it follows.  It cannot be reduced to the 
unconscious.  The purpose of psychoanalysis is not to “cure” the analysand (i.e. the 
patient), that is just therapy.  The purpose of psychoanalysis is to restore the desire to the 
analysand which the analysand did not acknowledge but still lies within.135 
There are three “phases” for Lacan: 
1. The Real is “the order preceding the ego and the organization of the 
drives.”136  In other words, it cannot be experienced because it is full or as 
Lacan would say, it lacks lack.  It has no boundaries, borders, limits or 
oppositions.  But this is not the same as reality.  Reality is lived and 
experienced through the imaginary and symbolic orders.  Before the child 
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forms a self, he or she is in this phase.  The child does not see any 
boundaries; he or she does not distinguish the differences between him or her 
and the environment.  Eventually, the child discovers a lack and enters the 
Imaginary. 
2. The Imaginary is “the order of identification with images.”137  Here, the 
libidinal pleasure is not regulated by law.  Relations of self and other govern 
the law, but the self sees itself only in terms of the other.  The self sees itself 
through the other: “The I is truly an other.”138  However, this is regulated by 
a third term: the Father.  The Name of the Father cuts off the possibility for 
the child to engage in pleasure with the mother.  Through the imaginary, the 
(symbolic) father castrates the child and enters him or her into the symbolic.   
3. The Symbolic is the world we live in through the Law of the Father and 
language.  The child has learned the idea of Otherness and has found the 
“self” through its own other, the image in the mirror.  It is the structure of the 
world and we have to enter it in order to become speaking subjects, in order 
to say “I”.  As such, having a self means to project the imaginary projection 
of the self onto an image, the other in the mirror.  The position of the self and 
other is lacking.  Everyone wants to get rid of this lack and everyone wants to 
reach this position to get rid of the lack.  Under Derridian terms, it is the 
center of the structure that everyone wants to reach and the center of this 
structure is the Other or the Phallus.   
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There is a never-ending lack which Lacan calls desire: we are 
constantly trying to get rid of lack but it can never be done.  The desire is the 
desire to be the Other, the desire to be the center of the symbolic order, or 
language itself.139  It is also where sexuality comes into play for “human 
sexuality is not governed by the laws of nature, and does not culminate in a 
‘normal genital sexuality’ which aims at procreation, but is rather governed 
by the symbolic order and the law of the signifier.”140 
What are the stages the people go through to reach the symbolic order?   
1. The Pre-Oedipal phase – this is the blissful state where there are no splits or 
divisions.  The self has no conception of boundaries with the other.  As far as 
the neonate is concerned, they are one.  The infant is everywhere fragmented:  
his or her zones, pleasures, sensations, and impulses are a series of aggregates 
as opposed to a whole totality.  Each part wants to satisfy itself instead of the 
body as a whole.  The infant is driven by needs which are satisfiable. 
Eventually, the child sees itself as relating itself to others.  It is a split 
between self and other and is dependent on others.  It does so by demands 
because to demand something is to make some sort of communal gesture to 
the other.  But demands are not quite that easy to satisfy.  With needs, they 
can be satisfied with an object, but demands usually have no object.  The 
child demands recognition or love.  In other words, once the baby realizes 
that it is a separate entity, it can never go back to the Real because he or she 
                                                 
139
 “[D]esire substitutes the ‘absolute’ condition” (Lacan, quoted by Grosz, 64). 
140
 Shepherdson, 134. 
  
70 
already knows about the separation and that lack is possible.  The idea of the 
other exists and there is no turning back.  And the demand is for the “other” 
to disappear, to have a sense of fullness once again as it felt in the realm of 
the Real: to have all unity.  Alas, it is impossible because the infant 
unconsciously knows that the other is a separate entity.  The child makes 
demands to the other, but cannot articulate because the infant does not have 
language yet.  As such, the sex drive is driven by a lack; it is a return to the 
mother.  Pre-oedipal sexuality is chaotic and all over the place.  Erogenous 
zones are everywhere and circulate throughout the entire body.  Apropos, the 
infant does not have a concept of a self yet, only a concept of the other.  This 
is where the Mirror Stage comes in. 
2. The Mirror Stage – the infant sees an image of him or her through the gaze of 
the mother.  This stage is still pre-oedipal and pre-linguistic, but it is 
important to note that the visual apparatus becomes crucial.  The infant must 
first see the self as the mother sees it, as an other, before the infant can see 
him- or herself as a self.  The self finds itself through the other.  This is 
correlated with the Imaginary.  Eventually, the infant realizes a lack when the 
mother is missing or absent.  The child eventually “obtains” an independent 
identity of the mother.  Instead of being fragmented, the child sees itself in 
the mirror and sees that the image has “got it together” and is whole.  
Eventually, the child sees him- or herself in the mirror and then back to other 
people.  The child sees that people are whole and notices that the image in the 
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mirror is whole.  Thus, the one who is reflecting off the mirror must be whole 
as well.  However, what the child sees is not really the self, but only what 
“others” look like.  The child mistakenly thinks the image in the mirror is the 
“I”, but it is only an image.  However, the (m)other is there to reinforce the 
idea that the image in the mirror belongs to the child in the sense of an “I”, 
thus creating the ego.  We may be lacking the mother, but we are “whole” 
within ourselves.  This is why the “other” came before the “self.”  The child 
can recognize the other and can only get the self through the reinforcement 
from the other.  The self is other because we get our “I” through an image, an 
other. 
3. Oedipal phase – as the child slowly matures, it sees itself becoming more 
independent from the mother and sees the mother as the other.  It does so 
through communication which is the symbolic order.  Oedipal sexuality is 
fully concentrated on the genitals and reproduction.  However, the 
relationship between mother and child is cut off from the Father.  There is a 
(symbolic) castration of the phallus signifier.  Because of this castration, the 
child enters into language and is able to communicate with the mother, but is 
never able to return to the original source of gratification. 
From here, boys and girls take different routes.  By going through the Symbolic 
Order, both genders go through different doors.  For boys, they have a chance at getting 
the Phallus because they believe that their penis is closer to the phallus.  The boys 
identify with the father because the father represents the symbolic order, the logos.   
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Throughout this period, the boy obtains individuality and subjectivity as well as a 
dominant attitude. 
Girls, on the other hand, are lacking penises so they have a harder time achieving 
the Phallus.  They cannot fully internalize the symbolic order because they cannot 
identify with the father.  They see themselves as Lack.  Yet they still have language 
which means that they are part of the symbolic order.  How did that happen?  They were 
enforced from the outside; they had no choice.  So women do have language, but it is 
from a masculine order and masculine terms because it is the same language that men 
are given.  This does not express what women feel, however; it only expresses what men 
think.  In Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray has a double meaning with the word 
“speculum”.  She shows how men are mirrored as the dominators and that the perfect 
image of Man is God.  Woman, therefore, is a distorted version of man.  She has nothing 
to mirror.  The second meaning is the gynecological tool.  It is curved, so the mirroring 
is reflected back at the woman but what this does is opens up the feminine, the sexual 
difference in order to “jam the masculine model” in Western culture.  Irigaray does not 
want to come up with a new theory where woman is subject or object.  I shall mention 
how to jam the masculine model later in this chapter. 
His speculum is the female.  Her speculum is a curved mirror that surrounds and 
is surrounded by the female body.  It represents the other woman, not woman as man’s 
other, but another woman that is altogether different from man’s other.  She has always 
remained the object of male specula(riza)tion.  As is shown in No Exit, Inez mirrors 
Estelle which makes Estelle have no identity of her own.  Since women do not have 
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language, they must either speak gibberish or remain silent in the symbolic order.  Is 
there anything outside of the symbolic order, outside of masculine language?  Yes, but it 
is unknowable according to Lacan because anything outside the masculine order is 
unintelligible or it does not exist.  This is why woman have been considered the Other 
because they are outside the masculine order, thus unintelligible. 
From this, Lacan states that “The Woman does not exist,”141 he means that the 
subject’s sexual “identity” is regarded by what position “s/he” holds according to the 
phallus.  For Lacan, we do not use language to communicate; rather, we “enter into” 
language which has a fixed system of structures where the Phallus is the master signifier.  
The split between male and female is in the pre-Oedipal world, but because they both 
enter the symbolic, “[l]anguage tends to reverse that split.”142  Yet we cannot define the 
feminine because defining it would mean we would have to use language which would 
come from the symbolic/phallic discourse.  She has been suppressed by the logic of men.  
Because of this, men have never been able to understand women or the feminine except 
as a reflection of man or the masculine.  For woman to speak, she would have to be 
incoherent, stay silent, or else resort to speaking under masculine terms because the 
world that we experience “is but a manifestation of the symbolic order as it has been 
constituted by men.”143  Along with that, women’s sexuality is always compared, and 
defined in terms of male sexuality.  One would always be using masculine terminology.  
The little girl can never identify with her mother because she is already saturated in the 
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phallic order.  The little girl has no choice but to be indoctrinated into the socioculture 
order of reproduction so that she can take the mother’s place.  She must give up her love 
for her mother so that she can become one.  
To ask “what is a woman?” can never be asked in a masculine model because the 
answer will always come out in one form: lack.  She can only speak intelligently as a 
sexualized male or as asexualized.144  Indeed, Irigaray firmly states that she does not 
want to theorize about woman, but to secure a legitimate place for the feminine in sexual 
difference.145  Indeed, the feminine has been defined as the inverse of the masculine.  
But for women to become speaking (as) woman, they would have to be subjects in their 
own right.  
Why does this not happen?  It is because of the Name of the Father: the Father 
cuts off the possibility, he precludes the bond between mother and child.  He forces the 
child into the Symbolic realm and if she does not comply, she is seen as literally mad.  
The father  
prohibits both mother and child from satisfying their desires, whether the mother 
identifies the child with the phallus that she lacks or whether the child is assured 
of being the bearer of the phallus by satisfying, incestuously, the mother’s desire.  
Depriving them of the fulfillment of their desire, of the ‘fullness’ of pleasure, the 
father introduces them, or reintroduces them, to the exigencies of the 
symbolization of desire through language, that is, to the necessity that desire pass 
by way of a demand.146 
 
By cutting off the possibility to express her desire, she must follow the symbolic 
order where the phallus is the signified for all signifiers.  The masculine model has made 
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the rules for all language and the feminine cannot express herself because the possibility 
has been “cut off.”  Women cannot say that they are woman because that has no answer 
under the feminine symbolic.  To answer would go back to the masculine truth.  At best, 
“they” can only say “I am not” or “I am not one:”  “To claim that the feminine can be 
expressed in the form of a concept is to allow oneself to be caught up again in a system 
of ‘masculine’ representations, in which women are trapped in a system of meaning 
which serves the auto-affection of the (masculine) subject.”147  This is why two can 
never become one because women are the sex which is not one.   
As is expressed in her essay “The Eternal Irony of the Community” in Speculum 
of the Other Woman, Irigaray portrays Hegel as reducing woman to the role of object:   
 
Woman has no gaze, no discourse for her specific specularization that would 
allow her to identify with herself (the same)—to return into the self—or break 
free of the natural specular process that now holds her—to get out of the self.  
Hence, woman does not take an active part in the development of history, for she 
is never anything but the still undifferentiated opaqueness of sensible matter, the 
store (of) substance for the sublation of self, or being as what is, or what he is (or 
was), here and now. . . . In her case ‘I’ never equals ‘I,’ and she is only that 
individual will that the master takes possession of, . . . and finding some hint of 
her own self, her own ego, only in another, a You—or a He—who speaks.148  
 
Woman has no discourse of her own that can render an image of her own.  Man 
“specularizes” the world meaning that wherever he looks, he projects his own Imaginary 
onto the world whereby he sees his own reflection wherever he looks.  As a “male 
Other,” she cannot express her desire.  She has no reflection except a male one because 
Lacan’s Imaginary is male.  If women do look in the symbolic mirror, literally nothing 
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reflects back.  What Irigaray is suggesting that through the speculum—instead of the 
mirror that Lacan prescribes—the female genitalia could be a signifier as the Phallus is.  
In other words, Lacan’s theory is a prescription rather than a description of patriarchal 
thinking.   
Unlike Lacan, Irigaray claimed that there was within the imaginary a male 
imaginary and a female imaginary.  But this male imaginary is a love of the same.  The 
woman, because her body remains unsymbolised, is defined as raw material for the 
substrate of men.  Thus preventing a woman to encounter her imaginary.  What women 
must do is develop her imaginary.  From this, a feminine identity can develop without 
being defined or compared to the masculine.  This does not mean to say that she wants to 
replace the masculine with the feminine, or develop a new theory of subject or object but 
by “jamming the theoretical machinery”149 comes out a positive feminine excess where 
she will not be defined as a lack from a masculine standpoint.  This will produce distinct 
feminine discourses.   
According to Irigaray’s take on Lacan, girls lag behind in the imaginary while 
boys escape from the imaginary to the symbolic in the Oedipal phase.150  According to 
Irigaray, “Lacan’s account of symbolic subjectivity is simply the male imaginary which 
has been raised to the status of universal, phallic law.”151  The female imaginary is 
concealed by the phallus.  Although the Phallus is important for Lacan, he never 
explicitly explains why.  This is where Irigaray finds him problematic.  “[W]hat Lacan 
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calls subjectivity in the Symbolic is simply a representation of the male Imaginary.”152  
Concealing the female genitals from the Imaginary to the Symbolic depreciates her 
capacity for bodily pleasure.  However, this is not something to lament.  For Irigaray, 
“women’s life in the imaginary [is] full of untapped possibilities for women.”153  
Anything that woman knows about the imaginary, including sexual desire, is from a 
male point of view.  “In other words, the only woman we know is the ‘masculine 
feminine,’ the phallic feminine, woman as man sees her.  But, said Irigaray, there is 
another woman to know, the ‘feminine feminine,’ woman as women see her.”154  Is this 
possible?  Can we know the “feminine feminine?” 
It looks “impossible to think the ‘feminine feminine’ within the structures of 
patriarchal thought.  When men look at women, they see not women but reflections, or 
images of likeness, of men.”155  To know women—which would be impossible—we 
would have to know female sexual pleasure or jouissance.  However, jouissance cannot 
be known to women because jouissance is not thought or spoken in a phallic language.  
Were jouissance to find words to express itself, it would destroy the symbolic order.  
Jouissance, from the masculine perspective, is seen as “unproductive” pleasure.  Her 
orgasms are useless because her pleasure is not needed for (re)production.  Yet, this 
jouissance is not just genital orgasmic pleasure; it is a whole bodily experience and the 
masculine mindset would wonder what the point behind bodily pleasure is when genital 
pleasure is all that is needed for reproduction. 
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Even Freud does not see a feminine libido because the thought of a possible 
difference of a feminine libido never occurred to him.  Reducing the difference to the 
same is the truth: “the a priori and the desire for sameness can be maintained only if a 
single desire is in control.”156  “Irigaray thinks that because patriarchal men still 
unconsciously identify with the mother and the ‘feminine’, male culture is governed by 
men’s love of the same (other men) rather than difference (woman).  In what she 
describes as a culture of the same, woman, instead of being able to represent 
difference—what she calls ‘the other of the other’—can only represent reflections of 
men, which she describes as ‘the other of the same.’”157  Woman’s “otherness” is 
unrepresentable because the peripheral “other” is conceptualized in relation to the 
masculine domain.  Woman’s erotic interests are killed because they are reduced to the 
same.  The interesting paradox is that her pleasures and erotic capabilities are endless.  
She is always wanting more.  “In fact, this more is the condition of sexuate female 
desire.  Impossible, no doubt, to satisfy in everyday life.  But not pathological for all 
that.”158  What Irigaray wants to do is to show that difference should be taken into 
account where it is not a difference of Woman from Man, but an image of Woman-as-
Other. 
Irigaray’s new Symbolic would reconfigure the female Imaginary where this 
Symbolic would focus on the difference, specifically sexual difference described as two 
lips touching and re-touching.  “Woman ‘touches herself’ all the time, and moreover no 
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one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact.  
Thus, within herself, she is already two—but not divisible into one(s)—that caress each 
other.”159  But caressing under the masculine model is through a mediator: a child, 
preferably a boy.  With this child, man can identify with his son and rediscovers the 
pleasure of maternal fondling while woman touches herself again by caressing the part 
of the body that she lacks: her baby/penis/clitoris.160  By living in a phallocratic society, 
man is in control of history and is proprietor of woman and children.  But the downside 
is that he has lost the pleasure of his own body: his focus of pleasure is entirely on 
genitals whereas the pleasure of the feminine is a bodily experience.   
She has not found the value of her sex organs so she idealizes the penis through 
penis envy.  Sure there is the “mother” and “father”, but these are merely social roles; 
there is no true interaction of the couple.  They do not make love; they only divide labor 
by (re)producing.  This touching has no distinction between active and passive: it is 
always touching but not an “active” touching.  Yet her pleasure is from an indefinite 
touching.  By seeing woman as having sex organs everywhere and deconstructing the 
binary oppositions of penis/nothing or clitoris, a new system would emerge which would 
liberate heterosexuality.  It would explore the idea that both sexes can come together and 
not see love as a function of reproduction or the necessity for children.  Her sexuality 
would be everywhere: in touching, kissing, looking, writing, all over the body.   
From the masculine standpoint, how can women “touch” themselves when their 
own pleasure is denied?  How can women authorize themselves if they are lacking?  
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How can they “touch” each other if their virginity161 is regarded as something to 
penetrate and possess?  From the masculine standpoint, what is the function of woman’s 
sexual pleasure?  It is pointless.  On the other hand, knowing that a woman has an 
orgasm  
signif[ies] the success—men think—of their sexual domination of women.  They 
are proof that the techniques for pleasure men have elaborated are valid, that 
man is the uncontested master of the means of production of pleasure.  Woman 
are there as witnesses.  Their training is designed to subject them to an 
exclusively phallocratic sexual economy.  Novices succumb completely to their 
wide-eyed appetite for erection, violent penetration, repeated blows and injuries.  
Full-fledged female libertines speak and act like phallocrats: they seduce, suck, 
screw, strike, even slaughter those weaker than themselves, like the strong men 
they are.162 
 
Woman can have pleasure, but under the gaze of the man.  As long as he is there 
watching, anything goes.  No form of sexual pleasure is going to escape him, but the 
woman gets pleasure from touching, not looking.  Through touching, both are involved 
whereas the gaze is directed to one.  The male sexual enterprise is pornographic: he is 
always looking, aiming for repetition and quantity.  The feminine on the other hand is 
more sensual; everything is a new: the feminine is looking for quality.  Irigaray urges 
women to refuse the masculine order and to express the multiplicity of their sex by 
expressing love between women.  With this, “nothing is privileged” and no one is the 
master.  Instead of focusing pleasure on the genitals like the masculine phallus, pleasure 
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is happening all the time because the lips are constantly being touched by one another.  
The female Symbolic would generate fluidity, openness, and free play.  Under the 
phallus, male sensation takes on binary oppositions where everything is privileged and 
controlled.  Ironically, males are always experiencing a “lack” by their unconscious 
dependence on the (m)other.  “Male lack, therefore, has been unconsciously projected 
onto women”163 by being reflected from their symbolic mirrors.  Males cannot take this 
symbolic castration so they lash out onto the other.  What needs to happen is to have 
sexual difference recognized by the sexes.  She should expand her jouissance right here, 
right now.  There would be no lack in jouissance because “[i]f desire is fundamentally 
lack, lack in being, jouissance is positivity, it is a ‘something’ lived by a body when 
pleasure stops being pleasure.  It is a plus, a sensation that is beyond pleasure.”164  So 
when Lacan stated that women can never know or say their own jouissance, Irigaray 
would reply that Lacan is not listening.  He cannot hear because he does not know how 
or where to listen.   
By recognizing the differences, both would have contributions to society instead 
of one dominating the other.  How can they acknowledge their differences?  What are 
the differences?  Particularly, what is sexual difference? 
Sexual Difference and “Essentialism” 
 What does Irigaray mean by “sexual difference?”  Admittedly, she does state that 
there must be a new perspective at how one views males and females.  Superficially, one 
could suppose that what she means by sexual difference is biological difference.  
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However, a closer reading reveals something deeper than that.  When we hear the word 
“difference”, there is an automatic negative connotation to it.  We think that for 
something to be different, it is lacking something (from the norm).  The different is what 
makes us think as extraordinarily avoidable.  Irigaray wants to see difference as a 
positive element.  Difference does not mean opposed, compared, or complimentary.  
Difference is a positive value where the different things are incommensurable.   
 Sexual difference may be confused with the coition.  Sexual difference does not 
have to do with the act of reproduction “but in the access the two sexes have to 
culture.”165  A result from this culture could be childbearing and reproduction as well as 
gender behaviors.  If there is no sexed culture, the genealogy of woman is collapsed 
inside the man which gets us back to the fusion that Irigaray opposes.  The idea is to 
have two sexes so that both sexes have their rights and justices according to their 
different needs and desires so that the power plays would be disestablished.  Ethics 
varies for different sexes.  For love to be possible, the rights of both sexes need to be in 
written code.  From there, the couple would convert individual morality into a collective 
ethics.  But in order for this to happen, there must be an ethics of the couple.  It is not an 
“either/or” dichotomy, but a “both/and” of difference.  
 Indeed, Irigaray questions the idea of Hegel’s master/servitude dialectic.  People 
have assumed that women—if they want to be taken seriously—should be considered 
equal with men.  Although it may look sexually neutral on the face of it, it actually 
presupposes a masculine bent.  “There is, similarly, a failure to raise the question of 
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what it means to be a man, and what it means for women to aspire to the ideal of 
equality with men.  There is, in short, no way of asking the question: what does it mean 
to be a woman?  The question of sexual difference is not yet posed—so long as 
feminism contents itself with representing women as if they were like men.”166  What it 
is like to be a woman has never been asked.  It has never come across its own terms.  It 
has only come across comparisons between men and women and usually stating that 
women fall short of men.  Thus, woman itself has never had their own terms, only by 
comparison with men has it been asked. 
 Now one could ask why not have a neutral language so that there is no bias or 
domination of one sex over the other.  Irigaray thinks finding a neutral language is 
pointless, mainly because no one is neutral on anything, but also because it is misguided.  
Irigaray’s response is that the neuter means neither-one-nor-the-other.  But “[b]efore that 
neither-one-nor-the-other can be signified, the one and the other must actually exist, two 
different identities have to be defined in a way other than as artificially opposed poles of 
a single human model.  Even if the identity of each gender has yet to be exhaustively 
determined or accomplished, we must use as our basis two irreducible identities.”167  The 
neuter is not real.  What is it?  There are two sexes and that is all.  Why have a neutral 
term if there are no neutral sexes?  As Irigaray states, “[w]omen and men exist.  Why 
sacrifice their reality to belonging to an abstract human kind that remains ill-defined?”168 
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The western culture is monosexual which means that men speak to men (the “I” 
or the same) and women are merely the mediators of this exchange of the “I”.  They are 
never partners in a dialogue.  Even something as simple as “I love you” is under power 
relations which the “I” seeks to master the “you”.  Sexual difference establishes an “I” 
for women as well.  “Women crave communication—the kind of intersubjective 
communication they once had with their mothers.  But because the norm for subjectivity 
is masculine, women can no longer say ‘I’ and ‘you’ with a feminine subject in mind; 
thus their language becomes oriented toward ‘he’ and ‘they,’ with ‘they’ assumed to be 
generically masculine.”169   
 Going with the theme of love and sexuality, Beauvoir’s look at Sartre is a helpful 
dialogue in that it reveals the gender bias in Sartre.  However, Beauvoir still leaves the 
dialectic intact where it becomes a Sartrean sexual game: “I will incarnate you in flesh 
and you will reveal my flesh for me.  Woman’s body is already colonized by the 
hegemony of male desire; it is not your body.”170  Such is the view of Beauvoir from this 
new brand of feminism.   
What Irigaray argues against the older feminist tradition is that women are only 
legitimated or recognized only through masculine ideological commitments.  To say that 
women should have equal treatment as men is to make women into men according to 
Irigaray, but there are differences between the sexes that give two perspectives, two 
knowledges, and two truths. 
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Invoking on specific knowledges or rationality is already sexed, but it is 
characteristically masculine.  In I Love to You, Irigaray argues for a sexual identity that 
is on a par with civil identity: we recognize civil identity in society, now we must 
recognize sexual identity.  “Upholding the rights of abstract citizens is not sufficient; 
since there are no neuter individuals, we need rights for real persons—that is, sexed 
persons.”171  Indeed, we see no respect for difference in our society, religion, or politics 
(“fighting for equality,” “equal in the sight of God,” “one and the same in the eyes of the 
State”).  Refusing sexual difference admits to a definition of one sex lacking in 
comparison to the other sex.   
  Why must Beauvoir look at a comparison between the sexes?  “To whom or to 
what do women want to be equalized?  To men?  To a salary?  To a public office?  To 
what standard?  Why not to themselves?”172  Equality is a utopian idea which has its 
limits.  We have seen men and women as one sex reduced to the other but one is lacking 
(i.e. man and not-man); never has identity been thought of in terms of difference, sexual 
difference.  “Women’s exploitation is based upon sexual difference; its solution will 
come only through sexual difference.”173  To get rid of sexual difference is what Irigaray 
wildly calls a genocide.174  Having equality is good, but not equal to men.  Women need 
to have their own subjectivity and freedom but in terms of their own objective rights.  
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What has happened in the West is that our conception of human identity is “theoretically 
and practically wrong.”175    
Under Beauvoir’s strategy, two loving people can work only if they have equal 
share in the relationship.  No one dominates the other.  Irigaray finds this wrongheaded.  
One reason is because—as Sartre states, loving the Other means that one desires to be 
loved—love is narcissistic.  Irigaray later states that saying “I love you” differently is 
impossible because the masculine has given women a definition of lack.  Under Freud, 
she must renounce the mother and her autoeroticism in order to love a man alone.  
Irigaray asks: how can she love a man without loving herself?176  She must love, but 
with her identity.  The female love of self has only been used in formation of man’s love 
of self.  She has always provided for the self-love of man by being the mother that he 
renounced as a child.  But “[w]ithout lips, there is no more ‘us’.”177  Irigaray could have 
said without the couple, there is no us.  They—the lips, the couple—are inseparable.  
Man has always seen woman as the Other, but more importantly, it is his other, 
“and not as Otherness, as difference in her own right.”178  Since woman has always been 
the other of man, woman has no other.  She is always subordinated to man’s desires 
because she is the object of desire, the mirror of the other without having developed her 
own sense of subjectivity.  It is because of this, Irigaray poses a new look at the relations 
between subject and object.   
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So for Irigaray, when a man has love for the other, the woman, he takes her as a 
narcissistic extension of the self.  It is the base for his own subjectivity.  Through 
tradition, we see the subject as the starting point and gender secondary.  We see this with 
Descartes where he doubts everything away until he comes to the “I” that is the doubter.  
I have also shown that Beauvoir cannot take on this starting position because she cannot 
doubt her gender.  For Beauvoir, gender is not a secondary ontology.  Irigaray agrees 
with Beauvoir by thinking that the subject as the starting point is a false start.  We must 
realize that we are two human genders.  That is our starting point. 
Criticism of Essentialism 
 Irigaray has been criticized for being an essentialist.  That is, she is accused of 
focusing her ideas exclusively in a single characteristic of women by concentrating on 
the sexual differences (i.e. males and females).  Thus, by looking at the differences 
between the sexes, the critics claim that Irigaray is giving men and women an essential 
character which the older generation struggled so hard to get rid of.  By claiming 
essentialism, society would go back to the standards of women being inferior to men.  
However, the claim is due to a misunderstanding and misconception of Irigaray’s term 
“sexual difference.”  Even Irigaray does not want to return to an essence: “When I say 
that we need to go back to the question of sexual difference, it is obviously not a call for 
a return to ‘genitality.’”179  This “genitality” relates to the penis and the vagina.  In other 
words, Irigaray does not mean to go back to genital or biological difference when she is 
talking about sexual difference. 
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 Could sexual difference mean gender differences?  Again no.  “[T]he process of 
identification with the masculine and feminine traits of the parent, which seems to evoke 
qualities in tune with the desire of the mother, will provide the child with the ready-
made answers that will define for her or him a place in the social fabric.  Gender and its 
cultural expectations, obligations, and rituals are therefore one of the outcomes of 
Oedipal dynamics.”180  In short, there is a division in the subject between the 
unconscious and ego because of a threat of jouissance of the Other.  Forming a gender 
merely displaces sexual difference; it does not solve the problem.  Gender difference 
also generates problems from before where one sees the masculine gender and the one 
which is not masculine.  “Any universal corresponding to a single gender or claiming to 
be neuter sins against spirit.  And to sin against spirit is absolute.”181  Sinning against 
spirit destroys the differences between the sexes. 
 Irigaray follows Lacan on what sexual difference is: sexual difference is a 
difference assigned in language; it deals with the relationship with the phallus: either the 
individual has it or is it. 
 As for the claim that she is aiming for heteronormativity, Irigaray replies that 
other sexual relationships are possible but  
[w]e are begotten by woman and man, we live in a society of women and men.  
Whatever our sexual choice may be, we have to resolve the question of the two 
human genders’ cohabitation, in and with each other.  Anyhow, in I Love to You I 
spell out how the relationship between woman/women and man/men can become 
non-hierarchical, non-instinctual.  The book’s objective is to create a culture of 
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the relationship between genders.  But this culture can become a model for a 
relationship in their diversity.182 
 
 Another reason taken from Bostic is that Irigaray has defined her audience as the 
couple.183  Irigaray does so because she notices that the relationships between the sexes 
have been violent and unhealthy by reducing woman to the same which annihilates her.  
One must keep in mind that Irigaray does not claim that someone of the other sex must 
become my life partner.  Love, for Irigaray, does not entail a sexual relationship.  
Irigaray theorizes love in terms of social relations instead of a focus on genital sex.  
Indeed, Irigaray would encourage us to learn to love both sides of genders regardless of 
sexual orientation.  “Closing ourselves off from love for the other gender means refusing 
to rethink the structures of our society.”184  
 Perhaps another reason has to do with the interpretations of the texts themselves.  
Irigaray calls for sexed rights and claims that she is sexuate.  Unfortunately, these do not 
translate to English easily.  We tend to think of “sexed” and perhaps “sexuate” in terms 
of sexuality, in terms of the sexual act.  However, to claim something that is sexed or 
sexuate means to think of the self as sexed.  The terms are used to describe the human 
subject as an identity while thinking of the body.  This helps us to think of “sexed” and 
“sexuate” as human identity.  It does not necessarily entail heterosexuality. 
How do we bring out the differences?  How can we acknowledge them?  
Difference has been excluded from discourse not because it was buried, but because no 
one has thought about it and in its place was an ontological hierarchy.  The history of 
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any profession has been male.  With males being the dominant role, they have always 
thought of moving academia forward with no bias.  Specifically, philosophy was so 
dominated by males that sexual difference was never mentioned until the previous 
century.  “Philosophy took itself to be neither male nor female.  It assumed the neutrality 
of is discourse precisely because there was never any reason to suspect that its discourse 
could be other than what it was.”185  And what it was was exactly other.  Without the 
possibility of sexual difference, the profession remains blind by male-dominated bias 
wherein difference is trivial.  After all, why should these males think about their sex 
when it came to philosophy?  Their maleness was not an issue.  So how does one “jam 
the theoretical machinery?” 
One of Irigaray’s methods was mimesis.  As she states, “[o]ne must assume the 
feminine role deliberately.”186  But why?  Irigaray asserts that to take on a role that 
inflates the feminine undermines the masculine model.  Mimesis tries to “recover the 
place of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply reduced to 
it.”187  It makes the invisible visible, by repeating the masculine logic.  Woman can do 
this by taking images of woman from a man’s perspective but giving it back in 
magnified proportions.  By miming, women can “undo the effects of phallocentric 
discourse simply by overdoing them.”188  By miming, one states exactly what the man 
has stated, but at the same time has said it in such a way that the man has not said it.  In a 
way, it is a mockery of what the male philosophers have said by deconstructing their 
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authority.  An example from Tong would be if men view women as sex objects, then 
women should enlarge their breasts and walk into church on Sunday, fully naked as if to 
say “Look at me boys.  This is what you wanted to see since these are on your minds.  
See if we care.”  It is a playful exaggeration of the male fantasy.  By parroting male’s 
fantasies, it becomes a parody.  The mimesis is an unbridled mimicry.  This reveals the 
destructive powers of males’ projections of woman.  “Mimesis is the term Irigaray 
appropriates from the vocabulary of philosophy to describe her strategy, transforming 
woman’s masquerade, her so-called femininity into a means of reappropriating the 
feminine.”189 
Another method is to have what she calls homoerotic relations with women, 
specifically with their bodies.  This does not mean that the only appropriate sexual 
relation among women is lesbianism, but rather to gain a female sexual identity by 
overcoming the Oedipal hatred of the feminine and learn to love one another.  This love 
would be different than love understood now through a Freudian framework, through 
mimicking masculine desire.  By doing so, “women capable of loving one another for 
their own sakes have the autonomous identity needed to love men as ‘equals’.”190  
“Equals” here does not mean that men and women share an identical essence or nature.  
“Rather, Irigaray’s idea is that men and women must develop their own independent 
identities as male and female, identities that provide the basis for truly creative, 
nonexploitative interaction between the sexes.”191  The economy of women has been 
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subsumed as an exchangeability.  They have been seen as a commodity, a means, where 
the men trades the woman in order to establish better relationships with the other tribe.   
 To have sexual difference “released” would mean that everything is “back” to 
free play; fluidity was never thought of because we were used to the solidification of 
language, the masculine model’s ear is “so clogged with meaning(s).”192  With free play, 
pleasure is never limited and everything is always moving, always open.  Yet the 
masculine has made woman’s erogenous zones clitoral.  But she does not have one or 
two sex organs; she has a whole bunch of them.  Her sexuality does not have to be 
expressed clitorally or vaginally.  One does not take over the other; they are both part of 
the intricacies of woman’s pleasure.  The masculine model had to make language rigid, 
cutting off the possibility of free play.  With everything being free play, nothing would 
be suppressed and everything would be pleasurable.  It would give the possibility of a 
new language, a language where everything is not defined by a masculine model: “it 
could no longer, all by itself, define, circumvene, circumscribe, the properties of 
anything and everything.”193  What has happened is that man has been the subject of 
discourse in everything.   
If these positive and negative poles are not found in both, the same one always 
attracts, while the other remains in motion but lacks a ‘proper’ place.  What is 
missing is the double pole of attraction and support, which excludes 
disintegration or rejection, attraction and decomposition, but which instead 
ensures the separation that articulates every encounter and makes possible 
speech, promises, alliances.194 
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Separation is the key for sexual difference, but more importantly, acknowledgement of 
finiteness and limits.  Both sexes need to realize this within sexual difference, but how 
do we do so?  By “affirmation of the body.”195  By perceiving and acknowledging the 
body as not an object, but as part of the relationship.  However, this can be easily 
forgotten.  The masculine sees her as an object, a place. 
Against Sartre 
 Because she is a place, she is a thing.  Occasionally however, this thing talks; yet 
he ignores her.  He gives her no subjectivity and since she is a place which makes her a 
thing in this intersubjective dynamic, man remains within a master-slave dialectic.196  
The reason why Sartre thinks that love relationships are conflictual is because he 
assumes that she is a place, a thing.  Of course, this makes sense in Sartrean ontology 
because his whole point was to love a being-in-itself.  However, Sartre could reply by 
stating that that is not what he is after; what he wants is the being-for-itself but he never 
obtains it.  The lover can only do so by making consciousness into an object.  While this 
may be true, Irigaray’s point is that the intersubjective dynamic only works with two 
subjects.  Sartre has not provided that.  He is only admitting one subject which 
encounters an object.  There is no other for Sartre, only an Other—an object, a thing.  
This is where Irigaray relives Descartes’ view of wonder. 
The initial interaction between the individuals would be wonder: we would 
always see them a new, something very different from what we knew.  With wonder, 
there is no need for a fusion; we wonder at their excess and differentiation.  “Thus man 
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and woman, woman and man are always meeting as though for the first time because 
they cannot be substituted one for the other.  I will never be in a man’s place, never will 
a man be in mine.  Whatever identifications are possible, one will never exactly occupy 
the place of the other—they are irreducible one to the other.”197  But the passions have 
been reserved for other things or else repressed.  The space of wonder is only left for the 
works of art, but never between man and woman.  The magic has died and monotony 
takes its place or else “attraction, greed, possession, consummation [or] disgust.”198  
Contra Sartre, having wonder does not seize or possess the subject into an object.  We 
have lost wonder and Sartre has forgotten this.   
Before we think of appropriation, possessing or even seducing, there is wonder 
for “wonder is the appetite for knowledge of who or what awakens our appetite.”199  We 
often tend to think that what we love is what we know and what we know is what is most 
familiar.  Is it possible to wonder at what is most familiar?  Irigaray answers yes because 
wonder always encourages attraction to something which impels us to go toward it even 
if there are differences.  One can wonder what the other person is going to do next and 
be surprised what the outcome is.  What Sartre lacks in his phenomenology is desiring 
the other in their difference. 
We need to conceive of love as something wonder-full so that “the sexual 
encounter would be a festive celebration and not a disguised or polemical form of the 
master-slave relationship.”200  “Sexual difference is, as it were, the most powerful motor 
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of a dialectic without masters or slaves.”201  The two of sexual difference gets us away 
from the master/slave dialectic.  In other words, Sartre did not think about the sex of the 
other.  Desiring for him is trying to find a gain from the relationship.  After all, his desire 
is to make himself the whole world for the one he loves.  Irigaray refuses the 
subject/object dichotomy.  She states that recognizing the other still means respecting 
him or her as a subject.  For Sartre, touching and caressing are modes of seduction; for 
Irigaray, touching invites teaching—wisdom—on how to continue becoming so that the 
lovers can approach each other in wonder.  Both sides are involved.  There may be a 
dialectic but it does not reduce one as master over the other.  The dialectic must involve 
an other.  Sartre can only see pleasure as an act of power.  For Irigaray,  
[t]he caress is no longer a gesture that aims to grab hold of the other, in his/her 
freedom, mystery, “virginity” or “integrity” (as is still the case with Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, Levinas).  It becomes a gesture between two subjects, a gesture 
that gives each one (masculine and feminine) back to him/herself while creating 
a relationship between the two.  In this way, the carnal relationship can become a 
love relationship in two and not a constant reduction of the one, and particularly 
the feminine one, to the other’s object or prey, unless it reduces the two subjects 
to nothing, to a zero tension in Freud’s words, a ‘little death.’202 
 
The caress is a “reciprocal gesture capable of bringing about an awakening to another 
level of intersubjectivity.”203  By appropriating the other, I possess the other and use him 
or her to tell me “I love you.”  Thus, it reinforces the idea that I am loved and who I am. 
What Sartre is forgetting is that the in-itself is the world of sensations.  The for-
itself is the universal according to Sartre.204  Sartre may reject love, but he still holds on 
to the rubric of “true love” which the feminists typically find an overvaluation.  He 
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maintains the idea that the lovers involved must be equal in order for love to work.  Why 
have that assumption?  He is assuming that love should make lovers equal.  Thus, love 
for Sartre is static because he does see love as an unreaching and unchangeable goal.  
What we need is a form of recognition that does get us into the master/slave relationship: 
we should see recognition not marked or revolved around hierarchy.  Here, Sartre does 
not respect the other’s transcendence according to Irigaray.  “I respect you not so much 
because you are transcendent to your body, but because you are transcendent to me.”205  
Sartre escapes the negativity by negating the in-itself.  Irigaray formulates a new 
perspective.  Instead, she states that the body—which Sartre would consider as facticity 
or in-itself—“already involves the for-itself.”206  The body is already consciousness.  
What does this entail?  It means that the body does not need to negate itself; rather, the 
body returns to itself and cultivates that being: a sexuate body, a body that has 
consciousness which is his or her own.  We need to be two instead of one + one which 
are abstract parts of a community.  Where Sartre sees the other’s consciousness as an 
object obstructing one’s projects, Irigaray reminds Sartre that I am a consciousness only 
because of my relationship with and through the other.  There is no fusion because the 
couple can respect each other’s difference, make a space within each other.  Whereas 
Sartre sees the not-being-you the heart of negation, Irigaray sees it as a security, a sigh 
of relief.  It does not divide us into a subject who observes and an object that is 
observed.  Sartre wants all barriers gone, Irigaray sees these barriers as a sanctuary.   
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 Does that mean that Irigaray wants a we?  She does state that a we needs to be 
formed, but this we is not the typical we that we find in traditional society.  This we 
“means being at least two, autonomous, different”207 whereas it has been seen as 
bringing the two into one.  We tend to go back to binary terms, where we reduce the 
subject into an object experiencing sensations and pleasures.  The relationship does not 
consist of a subject and object but of two subjects where they both leave the subjectivity 
of the other intact.  And here is where I will formulate love in Irigarayan terms. 
Love 
To love, one must begin with love of self.  We do so by loving the other, but the 
“voyage” back to myself is not what Irigaray has in mind.  That is a traditional view of 
love.  “When you say I love you—staying right here, close to you, close to me—you’re 
saying I love myself.  You don’t need to wait for it to be given back; neither do I.  We 
don’t owe each other anything.  That ‘I love you’ is neither gift nor debt.  You ‘give’ me 
nothing when you touch yourself, touch me, when you touch yourself again through me.  
You don’t give yourself. . . ‘we’ has no place.”208  What does Irigaray mean by this 
passage?  Women have been seen as places for men: wombs, homes.  Where does place 
fit in for woman if she is place?  If woman is a place for man, then she is a thing.  So 
what is the solution?  Irigaray claims that if we construct a new form of ethics, an ethics 
of passion, then we can conceive of place and sexual difference in a new way.  Indeed, 
the place is empty so it seems that this place is no-place.  “If any meeting is to be 
possible between man and woman, each must be a place, as appropriate to and for the 
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other, and toward which he or she may move.”209  The woman as place can only have 
things in her: man and at times a child.  She has no place for herself, no space which she 
can call her own.  The place that she has belongs to man.  But Irigaray asks: would it not 
be better if man and woman enveloped one another without destroying each other’s 
envelopes? 
 To love someone traditionally is to place limits (the master/slave dialectic) but it 
is usually the woman who is limited.  What happens is that he buys her a house and 
“shuts her up in it.”210  He gives her clothes which conceals that nudity that is her.  Her 
unlimitedness becomes bound.  Instead, why not recognize sexual difference where we 
acknowledge each other’s differences, already knowing that both are limited when we 
encounter each other?  Against the mainstream binary of reason/emotion where reason is 
the privileged term, “one should not have to give up love in order to become wise or 
learned.  It is love that leads to knowledge. . . It is love that both leads the way and is the 
path.”211   
 How does Irigaray see love?  In “Sorcerer’s Love,” Irigaray describes love the 
way Diotima thinks of it: as always moving and in a state of becoming.  Love is the 
mediator:212 the intermediary between pairs of opposites: poverty/plenty, 
ignorance/wisdom, ugliness/beauty, dirtiness/cleanliness, death/life.  Traditionally, the 
aim of love was procreation, but through Irigaray’s Diotima, love is already harmonious 
between the lovers by seeing the beauty.  “It is not procreation that is beautiful and that 
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constitutes the objective of love.  Love’s aim is to realize the immortal in the mortal 
between lovers.”213  To realize the immortal in the mortal?  What does that mean?  It 
means “there is a creative and fecund interchange between two who are radically 
different from each other coming together in a union in which difference is not 
eradicated.”214  Immortality is a task that we have as mortals; we must constantly 
transmutate because the body is always going through something new, something full of 
wonder.  The body—as well as spirit—is continuously changing.  Why mess that up 
with a child?  Procreation of a child cannot become the goal of love because the love 
between the lovers looses its growth.  According to Diotima, what we seek in love is the 
fruition of interaction, not reproduction; we seek in love the fecundity of dialogue, not a 
child.  When it comes to sex, we automatically link it to reproduction.  What has 
sexuality come down to?  The aesthetic is lost; it all comes down to technique.  Why not 
link it to a relationship between the sexes?  She may want some good to come out of 
love, but the resulting “goods” are plural, not a possession of just one individual.  We 
create the world instead of dividing it up.  The love between the couple is the creativity, 
the process which we create new forms.  These forms could be anything: an idea, a child, 
a theory, a method.  But when these forms are thought of as a pre-existing ideal, the love 
is gone.  The child is a false imagination of the parents, the idea is merely an abstraction, 
the theory is confused intellectualism, and the method is a means by which to have 
control.  There is no creator and created, but two co-creators/created as living bodies.  
The third term that Irigaray asks for is “a place for love.”  Without this third term, there 
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is no acknowledgement of differences.  We are in a constant regrowth, thus the constant 
wonder between the lovers.  Immortality that comes from a child is a false mask; the 
immortality is already within the lovers.   
However, Socrates interprets Diotima as love having an ultimate goal: falling in 
love no longer constitutes a becoming of the lover himself, of love in the lover (male or 
female), or between the lovers, but is now the teleological quest for what is deemed a 
higher reality and often situated in a transcendence inaccessible to our mortal condition.  
A teleological goal makes love have a target outside the couple; it is now an individual’s 
quest.  With this idea in mind, love becomes a duty or a means for a higher purpose.  
Under traditional terms, woman’s love is toward a man and child, but not this particular 
man, not this particular child.  “She must love man and child as generic representatives 
of the human species dominated by the male gender.”215  Her love is a familial duty and 
is subjugated to reproduction and motherhood.  The man, however, can love this woman 
with no qualms.  But the purpose of love, its telos is “the accumulation of family 
capital.”216  Without the establishment of a family, without the coming of a child, the 
relationship is seen as a failed love.  Love, in its full form, must come with a family 
under the tradition; otherwise, the couple has not shown its full potential as real lovers.  
If a man leaves, he can start over and move on.  The woman however, must make herself 
available but still sacrifice her identity for the sake of the child as well as being a 
mother.  Thus, love must come first from the couple, before the idea of a family comes 
to mind and to do so, there must be intersubjective desire.  “In other words, male desire 
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must become desire for oneself as man and for the other woman. . . . This realization 
takes place in the body proper and in the couple that man forms with the other sex—
woman.  The couple forms the elementary social community.”217  But they do this task 
interdependently, the task is to have love through a “natural and cultural world 
engendered by women and men at a given moment in History.”218  And “[t]he natural is 
at least two: male and female.”219  “Authentic” love, according to tradition, can only be 
proven under the recognition of the State, religion, or some accumulation of property.  
Genuine love, however, does not truly exist now.   
The love that Irigaray denounces is familial, in human goodness, knowledge, and 
institutional relationships.  This kind of love is a wisdom ordering the city, but a 
constructive relationship between both the sexes would be to express their love for 
themselves and each other.  Knowledge is linked to love.  We should get it back to a 
love of wisdom which would give us a wisdom of love.   
To use sex as a means for bringing children or forming a family is a perversion 
of love: it fails to clarify the attraction between the sexual couple.  In other words, love 
for Irigaray would be free, a play of texts and bodies, without any institutions or 
establishments of doctrines, politics or commitment.  If not, it is stuck in the masculine 
order.  Thus the idea of a fusion of lovers but even through this, “lovemaking can only 
plunge him into a fusional loss of identity.”220  Procreation of a child is not the aim, but 
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procreation of beauty.  The idea, however, is the immortality of the soul is privileged 
over the beauty of the body and we can see this in our society (“appearances are 
superficial; it’s what’s on the inside that matters”); we see that the immortality of the 
soul is privileged over the beauty of the body.  What the man expects of woman is a 
child to carry on the name, thus immortality,221 but what he never realizes is that the 
immortality is already in the love between them.  If “[t]o fall in love, to become divine, 
or immortal, is no longer left to the intermediary current but qualified, hierarchized. . . 
[then] love dies as a result.”222  The man wants the child to carry on the name, his name 
to provide a family, his family.  Love no longer becomes something between man and 
woman but has made man superior in love. 
 Even marriage is seen as a goal for some contribution from the State.  The 
contract of marriage makes the outcome of property, food, benefits, children, etc.  But 
what about love?  Where is love in the contract?  Why even have a contract?  “Under no 
circumstances should ‘marriage’ entail the loss of generic identity in a private or public 
institution.  It is the engagement of two intentionalities to realize the finality of their 
gender.”223  To realize the differences, we must not see each other as objects, but as an 
other, an other that has a body and his or her own world and an interiority that is specific 
to the other which we both respect and desire for what he or she is.  Instead, “[t]he 
‘marriage contract’ would then become a contract between two different civil persons 
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who preserve their identity rather than losing it in the unity of the familial institution.”224
 The love may constitute a “we” but this “we” is not a fusion where the people 
involved monitor each other by seeing who sacrifices more or less.225  The ethical 
relations that Irigaray wants are where the exchanges are incommensurable.  We can 
have reciprocity with incommensurability.  A masculine look of subjectivity is 
immutable and univocal; the free play of Irigaray suggests that subjectivity is gendered, 
dynamic, and multivocal.  The signifiers are always slippery.   
But what is Irigaray getting at here with love?  Is this free love?  “So as not to 
remain fixed on a rare object, it is appropriate to turn voluntarily toward several objects.  
So as not to be attached to one unique woman, is it desireable to scatter oneself among 
several?”226  Perhaps, but this does not mean free sex.  What would reproduction and sex 
look like under Irigarayan terms?  Irigaray answers using a different interpretation of the 
Virgin Mary as an example of a reciprocal love and sex: 
The Annunciation is given the following rather univocal interpretation nowadays: 
Mary, you who are young and still a virgin, thus beautiful and desirable, the 
Lord, who has power over you, is informing you through his messenger that he 
wishes to be the father of a son to whom you will give birth.  Mary can only say 
“yes” to this announcement because she is the Lord’s possession or his property.  
The mystery of the angel remains. 
 There is another possible interpretation: Mary, you who, from 
adolescence, are divine, because you were born of a woman faithful to herself—
Anne, the one said to have conceived without sin—you who are thus capable of 
intersubjectivity, the expression of love between humans, do you want to be my 
lover and for us to have a child together, since I find you worthy of this even 
though you are young, inexperienced and without any possessions.  It is only 
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your thanks to your yes that my love and my son may be redemptive.  Without 
your word, we may not be carnally redeemed or saved.227 
 
The touch comes even before the oral stage in Freud’s psychosexual 
development.  Through touch, the desire is not there because the intimacy of touching 
focuses on the dynamic relationship, not on a mode seduction.  Waiting is possible so 
that through caressing, the caress comes back but in “full” form and strength, love.  
Through the caress, it speaks to me and I can speak back.  For Irigaray, caressing does 
not seek to dominate the other as it does for Sartre.  Instead, it opens upon a future, a 
future where new life is given to the lovers.  The caress makes us acknowledge the 
differences; sameness makes the other inaccessible.  Fluidity and porosity occur in 
difference.   
The act of love is neither an explosion nor an implosion but an indwelling.  
Dwelling with the self, and with the other—while letting the other go.  
Remembering while letting the other be, and with the world.  Remember the act 
not as a simple discharge of energy but for its characteristic intensity, sensation, 
color, and rhythm.  The intensity would be or would constitute the dimensions of 
the dwelling, which is always in process.  Never complete.  Unfolding itself 
during and between the schedule of encounters.228 
 
But if the woman is assigned to a place of non-human bareness—an object, a 
thing—love has no dwelling.  There is a contact between the lovers and this contact 
makes the subjects go through constant transubstantiation.  Unlike Sartre however, the 
other may be transcendent, but that does not mean that he or she is on different plane of 
existence and I must reach up there to make love possible.  Rather, he or she has 
transcendence in the sense in which I cannot bankrupt the novelty of the other.  With 
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touch, the lovers are forming each other; the gaze is one-sided where the gazed upon has 
not given permission to be re-formed.  With touch, there is a mutual fecundation: “the 
gift to each of the lovers of sexuate birth and rebirth.”229  They are both lovers and 
beloveds.  There will always be something new, something fresh, something original, 
something different with the other no matter how many times I encounter him or her.  
There will always be something that I have never anticipated.   
In anther passage, Irigaray mentions that mucous has to be thought about in order 
to think about the female.  Through the mucous, hierarchical categories would diminish.  
What does the mucous have to do with sexual difference?  Are they the same thing?  
Mucous certainly does have the connotation of getting rid of solid mechanics which 
leads toward the fluidity that Irigaray prescribes.  Indeed, the mucous would 
“accomplish or reverse dialectic.”230  Science has no concern for the fuzzy, half-open 
sets: the fluid sets.  What would fluid sets look like in the case of love?  Figure 4 shows 
what love is from an Irigarayan perspective.  Notice that the end result shows that 
instead of the individuals coming together like the previous philosophers that we saw, 
the individuals actually move away from each other.  This creates the independence of 
the subjectivities.  However, because of love, there is a creation between them.  The 
point where they touch is important because it shows the fluidity of the individuals.  
They can still love each other without consuming each other.  Indeed, the hourglass 
figure could resemble two individuals barely kissing each other. 
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Figure 4:  The Irigarayan Model.  Since the individuals are fluid, the sets A and B are open.  There is an 
intersection of the individuals where the intersection is also fluid.  This leads to an hourglass shape where 
there is a point touching between the two. 
 
 
 
They affirm the otherness of the other.  This happens through the caress, an 
elementary gesture.  However, it looks as though there is still a fusion happening, but 
that is not the case.  There are still two.  “The loss of boundaries does not lead to a 
fusion in which one or the other disappears, but to a mutual crossing of boundaries 
which is creative, and yet where identity is not swallowed up.”231 
In I Love to You, Irigaray points out that comprehending the other is not the goal.  
Indeed, the lovers will never ‘comprehend the other’ because it is not something that 
either of them knows.  It is something each grants.  But as Deutscher states, “[y]ou can 
know a good deal about what you cannot comprehend.”232  There is no need to search for 
an object because within us, there is already a dialectic of subject and object.  I 
recognize by loving you that you are not mine.  Irigaray points out that from a male’s 
perspective, he views love as someone trying to love him: “I wonder if I am loved,” “I 
tell myself that perhaps I am loved” whereas the female is always reaching out: “Do you 
love me?”  Thus, to never appropriate the other, one must not love the other because that 
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creates the risk of possessing the other.  Instead, I love to the other.  What does the “to” 
do?  The “to” makes communication possible.  Irigaray notices that women tend to use 
“to” (à) in a relation of communication: to him, to you, to the other.  Whereas men’s 
usage of “to” does not contain any exchange between people: J’habite à Paris (“I live in 
Paris”), Nous sommes allés à la ville (“We went into town”), J’ai quelque chose à dire 
(“I have something to say”), Elle a à construire (“She has to build”), Je viens à 
apprendre (“I come to learn”).  Again, the word entre (between/among) is used as a 
relationship between people 65% of the time among women: “There is an atmosphere of 
intense curiosity among us,” “The distance between him and her was very slight,” “We 
are among friends.”  The men, on the other hand use entre as a negative indication of the 
relationship 58% of the time: “There is such coolness between you and I,” “There are 
problems between us;” and men’s usage eliminates difference: “There is no difference 
between someone from the Netherlands and someone from Holland,” “Between is 
within,” “Enter without knocking, there’re no formalities between us.”233  Women see 
difference as a space between that has a positive value; the men want to eliminate 
difference.   
 The word “together”: men use the word as an abstract collection and 
indeterminate; women use “together” where there are concrete individuals in the group 
frequently two individuals.234  A sense of the future is more revealing for women for 
“the future often reveals a desire for communication.”235  With the word “perhaps”, men 
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usually used it as a form of uncertainty or doubt: “Perhaps some would call that noise 
music,” “Perhaps she loves him,” “Perhaps I could have thought of something else;” 
women are more likely to use it as a way for opening up the future: “Perhaps I will go to 
my friend’s house to see her,” “Perhaps there will be a child in this house,” “Perhaps it is 
going to rain.”  Women are more interested in communication whereas men are more 
interested in a “collectivity that is poorly defined but marked by the masculine 
gender.”236  Women want communication but the only means to do so is through 
language; however, since men are in control of language, they only want to use language 
to denote reality.  We need to cultivate a language so that it expedites an intersubjective 
communication rather than simply transmitting information.  Men, however, want to see 
the world as subjects and objects.  Unfortunately, everything out there is objects.  The 
feminine sees relationships as two; the man sees relationships between the one and the 
many, between the I-masculine subject and others. 
 Recognizing each other means that we acknowledge that we are not whole and 
absolute.  This is where Sartre and Beauvoir made a mistake.  We can acknowledge that 
we are lacking, that we have a negative.  But this negative does not constitute a need for 
it to be filled.  “Respect for the negative, the play of the dialectic between us, would 
enable us to remain ourselves and to create an oeuvre with the other.”237  Recognizing 
the negative means to accept each other’s limits and not to make one reducible to the 
other.  The negative would have to operate differently.  The negative takes on these 
forms: “I cannot know you,” “I cannot be you,” “You are not mine.”  “As soon as I am 
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sure that I know you, that I know what you will do next, I have stopped having a 
relationship with you and instead have a relationship with myself, with my own 
projection onto you.  When I think that I know you, our relationship is over.”238  For the 
masculine subject, “he would need to take into account the limit inscribed in nature: he 
cannot appropriate the natural in order to proclaim that he is the whole.”239  Both the 
masculine and the feminine cannot have the whole in him- or herself.  We can construct 
a world, our world with both of our tasks.  We cannot completely identify with each 
other because we are not substitutable for each other.  We are not equal, which entails 
that we are not the same; never can we be irreducible to each other.  “Recognizing you 
means or implies respecting you as other, accepting that I draw myself to a halt before 
you as before something insurmountable, a mystery, a freedom that will never be mine, a 
subjectivity that will never be mine, a mine that will never be mine.”240  Since I will 
never be her master, this enables her to come toward me because of attraction and 
wonder.  No longer do we need to transcend each other to reach each other.  
“Transcendence is thus no longer ecstasy, leaving the self behind toward an inaccessible 
total-other, beyond sensibility, beyond the earth.  It is respect for the other whom I will 
never be, who is transcendent to me and to whom I am transcendent.”241  I am able to go 
towards a transcendence while remaining myself, without mistaking transcendence as 
spirit or soul.  But since I will never reach the other, he or she forces me to remain my 
self, thus retaining and respecting the differences between us. 
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 Genuine love would focus on the relationship between the individuals.  How it 
has been done is love is a means to (re)produce a child.242  Thus we need a new way of 
saying “I love you” because “I love you risks reducing the other to the object of my love.  
This way: I love to you, or in you I love that which both is and becomes, that which is 
forever foreign to me.  I desire you poses an even greater threat to an intersubjective 
relation than I love you.”243  We do not need to desire an object as Sartre maintains.  
There is no desire for the other (as an object) but rather a desire with the other.  This 
maintains full reciprocity without entailing a master/slave hierarchy. 
 “I love to you means I maintain a relation of indirection to you.”244  We do not 
make one irreducible to the other.  The “to” maintains an intransitive relationship for a 
transitive relationship makes the two into one.  The “to” is a mediator between the 
couple.  “The ‘to’ is the site of non-reduction of the person to the object.  I love you, I 
desire you, I take you, I seduce you, I order you, I instruct you, and so on, always risk 
annihilating the alterity of the other, of transforming him/her into my property, my 
object, of reducing him/her to what is mine, into mine, meaning what is already a part of 
my field of existential or material properties.”245  “The ‘to’ is an attempt to avoid falling 
back into the horizon of the reduction of the subject to the object, to an item of 
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property.”246  By having the couple revolve around themselves without possessing or 
consuming the other, both subjects are aware of the contributions to the couple of sexual 
difference so that love can occur.  The “to” is the supporter of the intentions of both 
subjects in the relationship; it is the inalienable space between us.  It is where I and the 
other can meet.  Love is between us which is the invisible bond through the negative, 
which is not nothing.  The “to” adds movement in the between.  In Sartrean terms, the 
“to” makes sure that there is a place of transcendence between us, a place of respect and 
possible alliance.  “You do not, then, find yourself reduced to a factual thing or to an 
object of my love, and not even to an ensemble of qualities, which make you into a 
whole perceivable by me.  Instead, I stop in front of you as in front of an other 
irreducible to me: in body and in intellect, in exteriority and interiority.”247  No need to 
make the Other an absolute, stop and recognize the other as other.  The negative in 
sexual difference means to recognize the irreducibility of the other.  I do not need to 
make space for the other.  The other has her space and I have mine.  There is no need to 
invade each other’s space.  What Irigaray suggests is that in traditional relationships, 
someone is always trying to occupy the middle ground instead of letting the negative be.   
 And finally, another way to respect the other is to see the other as a mystery.  To 
do so would mean to see the other qua other and not object.  I will not subject the other 
to my laws, to my world.  By seeing the other as a mystery, I can combine ethics and 
truth in my relationship with the other, but also realizing that this truth will never be 
mine because it is a mystery.  Yet, respect for a truth modifies my—our—relationship 
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with the truth.  “The other, whose mystery will never be a shared secret, the other who 
will always remain a mystery to me, is the other of sexual difference.”248  For Sartre, the 
caress continues until he sinks into the abyss of love.  Not so for Irigaray.  With 
caressing, Irigaray sees new possibilities open which reveals and re-reveals the mystery 
that is the other.  The mystery is a new birth of the other and with caressing is a constant 
wonder at the other.  
Lovemaking through sexual difference does not entail an acknowledgement of 
corporeality in both partners, but a kind of love that could redevelop the whole culture.  
Irigaray has suggested that starting from the loving couple; one could eventually build a 
democratic society that is built out of love.  It is a love that could get rid of the war 
between the sexes and finally find peace.  “Love between us, women and men of this 
world, is what my save us still.”249 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 One can still add on to this thesis.  The dialogue among these philosophers is far 
from over.  But I have shown a road on how to rethink our subjectivity, autonomy and of 
course, love.  We traditionally think of the subject as an autonomous and separate being 
in the sense where one is not dependent on other people, where one is free to control and 
command oneself.  Other people seem to be a threat because they place limits, 
boundaries and expectations of us.  Indeed, so much so that philosophy has regarded 
emotions, particularly love, opposing the rational freedom of the self.  Love has been 
seen as a hindrance on the self because it has been viewed as a dependence on other 
people as well as abandonment from one’s autonomy.  Certainly, Sartre is the prime 
example of this.  Sartre stays within the tradition of the fusion model of love, but 
concludes that the ending or goal of love is impossible.  He therefore concludes that love 
is impossible.  But the thought never occurred to him to think of a different model. 
 Someone like Irigaray proposes such a model.  Love is one of the most important 
connections to have with other people.  Not just in the intimate realm, but in the public.  
“What is fundamental for human beings, then, is not their self-involvement or their 
success in controlling others, but their affirmative connection and involvement with each 
other.  For it is the latter that provides us with the possibility of personal development, 
and in the love of another such personal growth may be enhanced to the highest 
degree.”250 
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 Love has always been seen as a form of domination and control, usually the male 
over the female.  As time passes on, philosophers have made love into an ahistorical and 
asocial category.  By moving from Sartre to Beauvoir to Irigaray, there is a slow shift 
from love as conflict to love as a connection.  As Beauvoir and Irigaray suggest, love 
should be nonhierarchal.  Yet, it is Irigaray who sees love between the two where the 
between connects and separates the lovers.  By reconceiving love, one can transform 
ethical, political, and social relations.  Love is the ethical strategy to move toward others, 
across the differences which is why Irigaray suggests loving toward you, and I love to 
you. 
 The traditional game of love starts with an overlapping of individuals where they 
share common features.  Over time, they begin to fuse.  The fusion, according to 
tradition, has a culmination where the lovers are perfected into an ideal form of love.  
Sartre, however, sees the traditional model and shows that the game has no stopping 
point; it is in continual play without end.  As this model suggests, love is—as Sappho 
would say—bittersweet.251  Such the tragedy of love. 
 Beauvoir interacts with Sartre and claims that the game may continue without 
end, but there is a way to end the game and have a fusion of sorts.  Her conception of 
ending the game is by making the woman have independence and status as does the man.  
It has been seen as the man subsuming the women within the fusion.  The man 
dominates the women which would entail sadomasochism.  Beauvoir’s response to 
Sartre is to make the individuals both equal; there would be no mastery, no domination, 
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and no possession.  If there happen to be any differences, the couple would try to get rid 
of them, ignore them, or confront them with stressful results.  They would be equal 
under their own terms.  Without equality, the game of love is torturous. 
 To relook at a problem and to fix it is a practical solution.  To reject the problem 
altogether is to do something completely different.  Irigaray proposes to do something 
completely different.  Her concentration is to look at the differences.  Her model of love 
rejects any form or rubric of the traditional model.  By looking at the differences, we can 
see how the other will never become ours.  The other is incommensurable from us and 
we must respect that.  The differences make love; finding commonalties tends to ignore 
the differences.  For Irigaray, there is no need to rework the traditional model because 
the traditional model needs to be rejected.  The union does not culminate love; the union 
is annihilation.  Focusing on the differences forms a new model of love where the 
concentration is on the betweenness of the couple itself and not the grindings of the 
fusion where one individual must succumb to the other in order to fuse.  The difference 
moves us.  Without difference there would be no movement.  And without difference, 
there would be no love. 
 Wittgenstein replied that the purpose of philosophy was to show the fly out of the 
fly bottle.252  Irigaray does so by finding a way out of this dilemma not with a solution, 
but with a resolution.  We have lived our love lives by, at best, integrating each other.  
That is not good enough.  There is no meeting each other.  An untranslatable word 
describes this new conception of love: auto-affection.  It is a “gesture for a return to 
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oneself, in oneself, a becoming oneself which does not stay in suspension in immutable 
truths or essences but which provides a faithfulness to oneself in becoming.”253  Love is 
not about giving or receiving to/from the other.  It is about meeting the other, by looking 
at the between of the couple and not this individual loves that individual.  This gesture 
notes that there is a gap because of the differences between us, but this gap is never to be 
filled.  This gap is made for dwelling.  To form a union would destroy the gap and thus 
the destroy the dwelling.  Without this auto-affection, “we fall back into fusion or into 
couples of opposites whose relation will be governed by hierarchy, submission of the 
one to the other, sado-masochism.”254  In other words, that will only lead to Sartre’s 
view.  There is no escape from Sartre according to the traditional view.  Instead of 
working within the tradition, one should conceive of love that is based on the couple.  
The other should remain flesh and becoming instead of an idealization of love. 
 But one could say that the gap would be nothing.  The nothingness should be 
filled.  The gap has been seen as a disastrous thing for lovers.  But my question is why?  
Why does the nothing have to be filled?  We often view the nothingness as a negative 
thing, but Irigaray suggests that this is reworked to a positive labor.  The negative has 
the phrases: “I cannot know you,” “I cannot be you,” “I will never master you,” but these 
negative phrases allows relationships.  “As soon as I am sure that I know you, that I 
know what you will do next, I have stopped having a relationship with you and instead 
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have a relationship with myself, with my own projection onto you.  When I think that I 
know you, our relationship is over.”255  We must come to terms with our own limits.   
The nothingness between enables us to meet.  The gap does not need to be filled; 
that was the assumption from anyone who has been in love or wants to be in a loving 
relationship.  The idea was to come together declare their love for each other.  But 
where’s the space between the lovers?  Where is the dwelling?  Where is the moment 
where the lovers can meet each other through the touch?  The gaze may act as a mediator 
from one individual to another, but the gaze has no reciprocity.  Vision has no intimacy, 
no connection.  The touch is always a moment of communication, always creating a 
relationship.  Recognition makes us aware of the differences between us instead of 
viewing one opposed or against the other.  We are inaccessible to each other but able to 
communicate because of what is between us: Nothingness.  Yet the space between us is 
not nothing, it is an invisible bond for us to communicate.  The Nothingness should not 
be ignored because the Nothingness is not nothing.256  The bond, the space between, the 
gap is what makes love possible. 
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